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THE CLOAK OF THE LAW AND FRUITS FALLING FROm 
THE POISONOUS TREE: A EUROPEAN PERSPECTIvE 
ON THE ExCLUSIONARY RULE IN THE GäFGEN CASE
Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree 
bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither 
[can] a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit. Every tree that bringeth not 
forth good fruit is hewn down, and cast into the fire. Wherefore by their 
fruits ye shall know them.
Matthew 7:17–20.
I. Introduction
On June 1, 2010, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Hu-
man Rights1 (ECtHR) delivered the final judgment in the case Gäfgen v. 
Germany.2 The decision came two years after the ruling of Section V of 
the ECtHR3 in the same case and established a landmark precedent in 
the jurisprudence of criminal evidence and procedure.
1 The European Court of Human Rights is based in Strasbourg, France and is often 
referred to simply as the “Strasbourg Court”. 
2 Gäfgen v. Germany, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2011) [hereinafter Gäfgen]. See Antoine Buyse, 
Introductory Note to European Court of Human Rights (Grand Chamber): Gäfgen v. 
Germany, 49 ILM 1597 (2010) (containing the full text of the opinion). As one may 
easily expect, the case was closely followed by German academic jurisprudence: see, 
e.g., Stephan Ast, The Gäfgen Judgment of the European Court of Human Rights on 
the Consequences of the Threat of Torture for Criminal Proceedings, 11 Ger. LJ 1393 
(2010). 
3 The judgment of the Chamber within the V Section of the ECtHR was issued on June 
30, 2008. The applicant successfully requested that the case be referred to the Grand 
Chamber pursuant to Art. 43 ECHR, according to which, in exceptional circumstances, 
a case may be re-heard “if it raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or 
application of the Convention, or a serious issue of general importance”. 
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The Gäfgen case addressed, among other things, a question that 
has troubled criminal procedure jurisprudence all over the world: When 
is evidence collected through conduct that shocks the court’s con-
science, as in the case of inhuman treatment or torture, admissible? The 
key issue in Gäfgen was how to sever the proverbial fruit from the poi-
sonous tree. In the words of Justice Felix Frankfurter, who delivered the 
opinion of the United States Supreme Court in Rochin v. California, the 
issue in such cases is whether brutality might be afforded the «cloak of 
the law,» and, if so, under what circumstances.1
Domestic constitutional laws across Europe prohibit torture and 
inhuman treatment. At a supranational level, the fundamental and non-
derogable Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (hereinafter ECHR) also prohibit such treat-
ment. Further, Article 6 of the ECHR guarantees the right to a fair crimi-
nal trial, which in turn implies a criminal defendant’s right to silence.2
This is not to say that illegally obtained evidence is routinely inad-
missible before courts of law across Europe. On the contrary, in Europe 
(as well as in the United States and elsewhere around the world) a great 
deal of controversy surrounds the scope and limits of the exclusionary 
rule, which prohibits the in-court admission of evidence acquired via 
unconstitutional means, such as illegal searches and seizures3 or unlaw-
ful and coerced confessions.4 All constitutional violations of a suspect’s 
1 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 173 (1952) (concerning the administration of an 
emetic against the suspect’s will, in order to retrieve morphine capsules swallowed in 
the course of a search). The term “cloak of the law” was then borrowed by the ECtHR in 
a similar situation (with regard the swallowing of “drug bubbles” by a suspect) in Jalloh 
v. Germany, 2006-IX Eur. Ct. H.R. 281 for which more discussion is provided below in 
part V. 
2 “Although not specifically mentioned in Article 6 of the [European] Convention, the 
right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination are generally recognized 
international standards which lie at the heart of the notion of a fair procedure under 
Article 6.” See, e.g., Saunders v. United Kingdom, 1996-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 2044, 2064. 
3 In the United States, with regards to constitutional violations of searches and seizures, 
which are governed by the Fourth Amendment, the exclusionary rule was first adopted 
in the federal system in, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 393-94 (1914), and later 
extended to the states in the landmark case of, Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961). 
More insights into the current state of the exclusionary rule in the United States are 
provided below, in Part VII.
4 In the United States, landmark cases include Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 
(1964), which provides for exclusion of confession (and admissions) made by charged 
defendants after the point that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel attaches and, of 
course, Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), which provided for exclusions of 
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rights–coerced confessions in particular–offend the community’s sense 
of fair play and decency, while also posing a long-term threat to the 
public’s confidence in the justice system.1 There is no clear consen-
sus among the Member States of the Council of Europe, the courts of 
other states,2 the International Criminal Court3 and other human rights 
monitoring bodies about the precise scope of an exclusionary rule for 
such illegally obtained evidence. Criminal litigation involving the offer 
of tangible evidence obtained in violation of fundamental (in Europe) 
or constitutional (in the United States) rights presents the unavoidable 
choice between guaranteeing fairness to the accused or the pursuit of 
«factual truth»4 of guilt. The former is the sine qua non of due process 
confessions and admissions made during custodial interrogation, where the suspect was 
not advised of his right to remain silent and right to counsel. 
1 Yet, the fascination with both the efficacy and virtue of torture remains strong in some 
quarters on the assumption that “torture has sometimes produced self-proving, truthful 
information[.]” Alan M. Dershowitz, Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge 137 (2002). See also Memorandum from J. Yoo to William 
J. Haynes IT, General Counsel of United States Department of Defense, (Mar. 14, 2003 
(the so called “Torture memo”). 
2 It is common for the ECtHR to take a cursory glance to foreign law in establishing 
“international standards” of protection. In Gäfgen, for example, exclusionary rule 
precedents of the U.S. Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa 
are quoted. Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 19. At the same time, some United States Supreme 
Court Justices, notably Justices Breyer and Kennedy, have spoken approvingly of the 
notion of looking to foreign law principles in the interpretation of American law, while 
other members of the Court consider such a notion to be repellent. Compare Graham 
v. Florida, 130 S.Ct 2011, 2034 (2010) (Kennedy, J.), with id., at n. 12 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).
3 See K. Vanderpuye, The International Criminal Court and Discretionary Evidentiary 
Exclusion: Toeing the Mark?, 14 Tul. J. Int’l & Comp. L. 127 (2005). The author argues 
that the establishment of a discretionary standard of admissibility with respect to the use 
of illegal evidence by the ICC “is likely to have a profoundly nocuous impact upon the 
court”, given the peculiarity of its jurisdiction and the compelling need for predictable 
decision-making. Id. at 176.
4 For a philosophical and historical distinction between “an absolute truth” (which is 
said to characterize the inquisitorial system) and a “more pragmatic, or compromised, 
truth” (typical of the adversarial system), cf. Matthew T. King, Security, Scale, Form 
and Function: the Search for Truth and the Exclusion of Evidence in Adversarial and 
Inquisitorial Justice Systems, 12 International Legal Perspectives 185, 187 (2002). 
The doctrine of the fruits of the poisonous tree “in both Common Law and Civil Law 
jurisdictions has vacillated between a strictly truth-oriented evaluation of the probative 
value of evidence and a human-rights based concern with important constitutional 
rights that sometimes trumps the state interest in a particular case to convict a particular 
criminal.” Stephen C. Thaman, “Fruits of the Poisonous Tree” in Comparative Law, 16 
Sw. J. Int’l Law 333, 382 (2010). American scholars and observers often distinguish 
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while the latter is the goal of crime control or the «public interest»1 as 
defined by those whose primary objective is the suppression of crime.
This article reviews the Gäfgen opinion and argues for a bright-
line rule of exclusion. Without such a rule, the decision whether to ad-
mit products of unlawful police activity inevitably becomes a balancing 
act that, despite taking into account the «totality of the circumstances» 
surrounding the illegally obtained evidence, nearly always results in ad-
mission.2 This paper also compares the current European perspective on 
the exclusionary rule with certain features of the corresponding Ameri-
can rule. Although there has been some reference to the «fruits of the 
poisonous tree» doctrine in past ECtHR rulings related to evidence ob-
tained directly from torture,3 the Grand Chamber’s decision in Gäfgen 
v. Germany offers the first comprehensive, structured analysis of the 
doctrine. Nevertheless, the ECtHR’s willingness to avoid the issue by 
resorting to a questionable totality of circumstances analysis has now 
set a troubling precedent.4 In essence, the ECtHR’s partial upholding of 
the German courts’ holdings suggests that physical evidence, discov-
between “legal guilt” and “factual guilt.” That is a person may be factually guilty in 
that he actually committed the crime, but at the same time not be legally guilty because 
the conviction was obtained in violation of the law. “Due Process” types, see discussion 
infra, demand legal guilt to support a conviction while the “Crime Control” types are 
satisfied if “we got the right guy.” This is not to overlook the fact that illegally obtained 
evidence, particularly in the area of coerced confessions, may often be factually 
inaccurate and untrue.
1 Arguments of public interest are the quintessence of the so called “crime control 
model”, conceptualized by Herbert L. Packer, The Limits of the Criminal Sanction 158-
163 (1968). In contrast with the due process model, the crime control model assumes 
that illegally obtained evidence is always reliable, a belief which albeit true with respect 
to the product of an illegal search and seizure, is very often untrue when it comes to, 
for example, coerced confessions and unduly suggestive lineups. According to statistics 
compiled by the Innocence Project, the clearinghouse in the United States for records 
of the exoneration of convicted, but innocent, criminal defendants, over the last 15 
years, 271 convicted Americans (many on Death Row) have been exonerated through 
DNA alone. Of those 271 exonerations, 75% involved mistaken identifications and 25% 
involved false confessions. See Annual Reports 2005-2010, The Innocence Project 
(www.innocenceproject.org). 
2 “Because physical evidence speaks for itself and, if relevant to the crime, is always 
credible, this prong of the balancing test will always be fulfilled.” Thaman, supra note 
11, at 353.
3 See Jalloh v. Germany, supra note 4; see also Harutyunyan v. Armenia, 49 Eur. H.R. 
Rep. 9 (2009) at para. 63 (holding that use of statements implicating the accused by his 
fellow soldiers, elicited after physical beatings, violated accused’s right to fair trial). 
4 Readers should be reminded that all Sections of the ECtHR “are expected to follow 
Grand Chamber judgments, regardless of cogent reasons, unless the case may be 
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ered as a result of confessions that are coerced or obtained under duress, 
may be admitted before the criminal courts provided that the mistreat-
ment does not amount to actual torture.1
By comparison, United States law excludes both physical evidence 
and confessions that are found to be the product of either an illegal 
search and seizure or an «involuntary,» coerced confession. A coerced 
confession is roughly the U. S. equivalent of a confession extracted by 
«torture or inhuman treatment» under Article 3 ECHR. However, the 
Supreme Court has recently decided that although a «mere» Miranda 
violation2 (a Constitutional rights violation) renders any elicited con-
fession inadmissible, derivative evidence from that confession will be 
admissible. The only exception is if the defendant can prove that the 
violation was intentionally perpetrated in order to obtain the second 
confession.3 This is so even though the second confession amounts to 
the «fruit» of the initial Constitutional violation.
II. Facts of the Gäfgen Case and Related Domestic Proceed-
ings
The Gäfgen case presented difficult facts. The state agents (the 
German police) faced a difficult and highly charged situation, which 
culminated in the death of an eleven-year-old boy. In September 2002, 
Magnus Gäfgen allegedly kidnapped and brutally suffocated a boy 
whom he initially held for ransom. German police, believing the boy 
could still be alive, obtained a coerced confession through ten minutes 
of mistreatment the day after Gäfgen’s arrest.4 During questioning, the 
suspect confessed that he killed the boy, and he later led the police to 
distinguished in some other manner,” David J. Harris et al., Law of the European 
Convention on Human Rights 18 (2d ed. 2009).
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 44
2 Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 446 (2000). 
3 Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 617 (2004). 
4 As the facts of the case are described by the Grand Chamber, early in the morning of 
1 October 2002, detective officer E., acting on the orders of the deputy chief of the 
Frankfurt police, D., told the applicant that he would suffer considerable pain at the 
hands of a person specially trained for such purposes if he did not disclose the child’s 
whereabouts. According to the applicant, the officer further threatened to lock him into 
a cell with two huge black people who would sexually abuse him. The officer also hit 
him once on the chest with his hand and shook him so that his head hit the wall on 
one occasion. For fear of being exposed to the measures he was threatened with, the 
applicant disclosed the precise whereabouts of the child after approximately ten minutes 
of questioning. The above description of the facts of the Gäfgen case is quoted liberally 
from Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 6-7.
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the place where the victim’s body was buried, near a pond in Birstein, 
Germany.
In April 2003, the German trial court ruled that the interrogating 
detective, acting under the instructions of the deputy chief of the Frank-
furt police, had used prohibited methods of interrogation.1 The detec-
tive threatened that the applicant would suffer considerable pain if he 
did not disclose the child’s whereabouts and hit the applicant once in 
the chest during the course of the interrogation.2 The self-incriminating 
statements that the applicant made in the context of that interrogation 
were excluded from admissible evidence as the product of inhuman 
treatment. At the same time, in the criminal proceedings, the German 
trial court allowed the use of evidence that had become known to the 
investigating authorities only as a result of the inadmissible statements 
extracted from the accused Gäfgen. This evidence was primarily the 
child’s corpse and the tire tracks matching the suspect’s vehicle. In the 
court’s view, the severity of the unlawful conduct of the police officers 
had not caused an intolerable violation of the rule of law. Due to that 
finding and the seriousness of the charges, the court opted not to bar the 
use of the aforementioned evidence.
On the second day of the subsequent trial, the accused confessed 
a second time. The original self-incriminating confession was admit-
ted into evidence along with the physical evidence found as a result of 
the earlier confession.3 Significantly, the defendant later claimed that he 
only made the second confession when it was clear that the physical evi-
dence would be admitted, in the hope of securing a less severe sentence. 
Since there is no separate phase for sentencing in criminal proceedings 
in Germany, evidence intended to mitigate a sentence can only be in-
troduced during the course of the trial. The defendant was eventually 
sentenced to life in prison. He later appealed to both the Federal Court 
1 It is undisputed that the conduct in question violated German law. The court of first 
instance specified that the methods employed in the interrogation violated the “human 
dignity” clause of Article 1 of the Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
(which is the constitutional law of Germany). The Conduct also violated Article 136a § 
1 of the German Criminal Procedure Code and Article 3 of the ECHR; cf. Gäfgen, supra 
note 2, at 8.
2 Two hematomas on then applicant’s left chest were confirmed, together with superficial 
skin lesions, by a medical certificate issued a few days later by a police doctor: Gäfgen, 
supra note 2, at 7.
3 The German court found that since the defendant was advised of his right to remain 
silent and choose to self-incriminate the second confession could be admitted into 
evidence. Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 19.
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of Justice and the Federal Constitutional Court, arguing that it was im-
proper to admit into evidence items that had been illegally obtained. 
Both courts upheld the conviction. After the domestic judgment became 
final, Gäfgen lodged an application to the ECtHR, claiming to be the 
victim of a violation of both Article 3 and Article 6 of the ECHR.
The two police officers implicated in the mistreatment were sub-
ject to both criminal and disciplinary proceedings in Germany. On the 
criminal side, the officers were tried and convicted of coercion and in-
citement to coercion committed by an official in the course of his duties. 
Their sentences consisted of daily fines of €60 for 60 days for the police 
detective and €120 for 90 days for his superior, the deputy chief. Sig-
nificantly, though, the court opted to suspend the fines, a measure that 
makes them payable in Germany only if the defendant police officers 
commit another offence during the probation period.1 As justifications 
for leniency, the courts cited the «sole concern [of the police officers] to 
save the boy’s life» and the «extreme pressure»2 from the public. As dis-
ciplinary sanctions, both officers were transferred to posts that did not 
involve direct association with the investigation of criminal offenses. 
A few years later, the deputy chief was appointed as chief of the Police 
Headquarters for Technology, Logistics and Administration.3 This com-
bination of initial transfer and subsequent promotion demonstrates the 
lack of rigor in internal police discipline resulting from the violation in 
the German domestic realm.
III. The Enforcement of Human Rights in Europe
This section examines the enforcement mechanism established 
through the ECHR and the role of the ECtHR, with regard to its review 
of domestic criminal procedure and evidence. This discussion is essen-
tial in order to understand (a) how the Gäfgen case made its way to 
Strasbourg, and (b) what the long-term influence of the Gäfgen opinion 
on the exclusionary rule across Europe may be.
1 Id. at 13.
2 Id. 
3 Id. at 14. As this article was being submitted for publication, on August 6, 2011 the 
BBC reported that a German Court had finally awarded Gäfgen compensation for 
the mistreatment suffered at the hands of the German police. The damage award was 
3,000 EUR. The authors believe that this paltry sum provides further evidence of the 
national denigration of human rights that are deemed non-derogable by the ECHR. 
This recompense, together with the minor discipline meted out to the German officers 
who coerced the confession, can only reinforce the argument for suppression as the 
only viable remedy for violations of important human rights while obtaining criminal 
evidence. 
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A. The Institutional Framework: Domestic Realms and the Law of 
the European Convention on Human Rights
The ECHR system may be regarded as the most advanced and 
effective international regime for formally enforcing human rights in 
the world today.1 Since 1953, when the Convention came into force 
through an international treaty, it has sought to protect a structured set 
of civil and political rights2 for all individuals subject to the jurisdiction 
of its Member States, whether those individuals are citizens, aliens or 
refugees.
Early on the Convention established a Commission to review ap-
plications. The Commission could investigate the case, seek to settle 
it, or forward it under certain circumstances to a court, the decisions 
of which governments were legally bound to follow as a matter of in-
ternational law.3 An originally optional clause of the Convention, later 
made mandatory, permits individual applications to the Court. In other 
words, any private individual or legal entity that claims to be the direct 
victim of a violation of a provision of the Convention can file an appli-
cation. The right of individual petition means that «individuals now en-
joy at the international level a real right of action to assert the rights and 
freedoms to which they are directly entitled under the Convention.»4 
The popularity of the ECHR system of human rights protection, and the 
large increase in individual applications to the Court, made significant 
reform necessary in 1998.5 The Commission ceased to exist and the ad-
1 See Harris et al., supra note 15, at 4: “Compared to most other international human 
rights treaties, the Convention has very strong enforcement mechanims”
2 The following rights, among others, are protected by the European Convention: the 
right to life (Art. 2); freedom from torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (Art. 
3); the right to a fair hearing in civil and criminal matters (Art. 6); the right to respect 
for private and family life (Art. 8); freedom of expression (Art. 9); freedom of thought, 
conscience and religion (Art. 10); the right to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions 
(Art. 1 Protocol 1); and the right to vote and to stand for election (Art. 3, Protocol 1).
3 The historical developments of the European Court of Human Rights are described 
at length by Andrew Moravcsik, The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic 
Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 International Organization 217 (2000) at 218.
4 Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 2005-I Eur. Ct. H.R. 332, 333 
5 The first ECtHR judgment was delivered on July 1, 1961. Lawless v. Ireland, 1961 
Y.B. Eur. Conv. On H.R. 430 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.). As explained in the 2011 Annual 
Report of the European Court of Human Rights (available at http://www.echr.coe.
int), “in the early years, the number of applications lodged with the Commission was 
comparatively small, and the number of cases decided by the Court was much lower 
again. This changed in the 1980s, when the steady growth in the number of cases brought 
before Strasbourg institutions was compounded by the rapid increase in the number of 
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ministration of the Convention was assigned to two separate bodies: the 
new permanent Court1 and the Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe.2
As a general rule, applications to the ECtHR may only be filed 
upon exhaustion of domestic remedies and must be submitted within six 
months of the date on which a final decision is rendered at the domestic 
level. In criminal proceedings, the typical case involves a person who 
was found guilty in a judgment upheld by the Supreme Court of a Mem-
ber State. Most criminal-related litigation before the ECtHR raises an 
issue of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment (under Article 3) 
or challenges the fairness of the proceedings brought against defendants 
at the national level (under Article 6). In Gäfgen, the applicant jointly 
filed these two claims.
B. The Impact of the Case Law of the ECtHR on National Systems 
of Criminal Justice
The European system for the protection of human rights has been 
the source of profound changes in the protection of rights across Mem-
ber States in the last forty years.3
Member States”. The 2011 Annual Report also shows that the number of applications 
registered annually with the Commission increased from 404 in 1981 to 4,750 in 1997. 
On a smaller scale, the Court’s statistics reflected a similar story, with the number of 
cases referred annually rising from 7 in 1981, to 119 in 1997. Growth in the workload 
continued after the 1998 reforms. In 2010, the Court received 61,300 new applications 
and issued 2,600 judgments (with an 8% increase in comparison to 2009). For a full 
account of the steady rise in individual applications to the ECtHR, see Steven Greer, 
The European Convention on Human Rights: Achievements, Problems and Prospects 
33-41 (2006). 
1 The ECtHR consists of a number of judges equal to the number of member States of 
the CoE that have ratified the Convention. Judges sit in their individual capacity and 
do not represent any State. The vast majority of the court’s judgments are issued by 
“chambers” (i.e. panels of seven judges within a section). Judgments of each section 
may, under certain circumstances, be referred to the Grand Chamber (i.e. a panel of 
seventeen judges which also includes the President and the Vice-Presidents of the 
ECtHR). In case of referrals (such as in Gäfgen v. Germany), the Court does not include 
any judges who previously sat in the Chamber that first examined the case. 
2 The Committee of Ministers (CoM) is comprised of the foreign affairs ministers of 
all the member states, or their permanent diplomatic representatives in Strasbourg. In 
accordance with Art. 46 of the ECHR, the CoM supervises the execution of judgments 
of the ECtHR in the manner explained later in this paragraph. 
3 Over the last half–century, the legal commitments and enforcement mechanisms 
entered into under the ECHR have established a truly peculiar supranational 
adjudication system in Europe. Compliance is so consistent that ECHR judgments 
are, in the views of some leading international scholars, “as effective as those of any 
domestic court.” See Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a Theory 
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First, although the ECHR system does not impose upon States 
the obligation to make the Convention part of domestic law, almost all 
States have nevertheless incorporated the Convention into domestic 
law. They have even made the application of ECHR law mandatory 
within the domestic realms. In Germany, Italy and France, the ECHR 
has been granted the status of a federal statute,1 which has some impli-
cation in the development of the Gäfgen case. In the United Kingdom, 
the ECHR was incorporated by virtue of the Human Rights Act of 1998. 
Typically, the Convention is granted some kind of infra-constitutional2 
ranking in the domestic realm, and the decisions of the ECtHR share the 
rank and significance of the text itself. In essence, the Convention and 
the precedents of the Strasbourg court are a source of domestic law and 
may be invoked directly by the national courts, as long as they do not 
conflict with the State’s own constitutional law. Further, the ECHR is 
now regarded by domestic courts and commentators as a «shadow Bill 
of Rights,» especially where no established domestic jurisprudence had 
been developed. These developments have prompted the Strasbourg 
Court to conclude that the European Convention is ’’a constitutional 
document of European public order.’’3
Second, major constitutional and statutory reforms at the national 
level have been prompted by the opinions of the Strasbourg Court.4 This 
of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L. J., 273, 283 (1997). In hundreds 
of cases in which a finding of violation was made in Strasbourg, Member States have 
amended legislation, granted administrative remedies, or paid monetary damages to 
individuals whose treaty rights were violated. In countless additional cases, litigants 
have successfully pleaded the ECHR before domestic courts. See Andrew Moravcsik, 
The Origins of Human Rights Regimes: Democratic Delegation in Postwar Europe, 54 
International Organization 217, 219 (2000). 
1 Sasa Beljin, Bundesverfassungsgericht on the Status of the European Convention of 
Human Rights and ECHR Decisions in the German Legal Order. Decision of 14 October 
2004, EUR. CONST. L. R. 553, 556 (2005). 
2 Along with Germany, this is also the case in Italy and France. In the United Kingdom, 
the Human Rights Act 1998 allows a limited measure of judicial review of primary 
legislation but “does not directly threaten parliamentary sovereignty.” See David 
Feldman, The Human Rights Act 1998 and Constitutional Principles, 19 Legal Studies 
165, 186 (2006). However, in some countries such as Austria, the ECHR has direct 
constitutional standing (see Austrian Constitutional Court collection of cases No. 
5100/1965). 
3 Loizidou v. Turkey, 310 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 76 (1995). 
4 The most updated and comprehensive account and assessment of the reception process 
across Europe can be found in Helen Keller & Alec Stone Sweet, A Europe of Rights: 
The Impact of the ECHR on National Legal Systems (2008). The book includes a series 
of national reports and selected statistics.
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is also true in the fields of criminal evidence and procedure, although 
these remain today a pretext for national parochialism. By way of illus-
tration, the «fair trial» discourse developed over the last three decades 
in ECHR law led to the 1999 fair trial amendment to the Italian Consti-
tution1 and the 2000 reform of the French Code de procédure pénale.2 
Further, ECtHR precedents directly led to national reforms to certain 
especially sensitive areas of criminal procedure such as–among many 
others–the use of anonymous witnesses in the Netherlands,3 the practice 
of unreasoned verdicts by juries in Belgium,4 and the rules for detention 
and questioning of suspects in Scotland.5
1 Article 111 of the Italian Constitution is now an almost literal reproduction of Article 
6 of the ECHR. For more discussion, see Stefano Maffei & Isabella Merzagora Betsos, 
Crime and Criminal Policy in Italy: Tradition and Modernity in a Troubled Country, 
Eur. J. of Criminology 461-482 (2008).
2 Following the 2000 statutory reform, a preliminary section was added to the French 
Code of criminal procedure. This section enlists the guarantees of criminal defendant, 
in a fashion that closely resembles the letter and spirit of Art. 6 ECHR. In France, a 2000 
statutory reform repealed and amended more than 170 articles of the Code de procedure 
pénale and inserted more than 80 new ones, thus leading commentators to announce 
the birth of a new French criminal procedure. Mireille Delmas-Marty, Une nouvelle 
procédure pénale?, Revue de Science Criminelle et de droit penal compare 3 (2001). 
3 Cf. Doorson v. The Netherlands, 1996-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 447, in which no violation of 
Art. 6 was found with regard to statements from anonymous witnesses that had been 
admitted into evidence in accordance with the “stricter requirements” set by the Dutch 
statute 603/1993. Statutory reform had been prompted by an earlier finding of violation 
on the same matter in Kostovski v. the Netherlands, 166 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989).
4 Taxquet v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R., App. No. 926/05 (16 November, 2010).
5 This is a good example of the far-reaching transnational impact of ECtHR rulings across 
Europe. In the leading case Salduz v. Turkey, 49 Eur. Ct. H.R. 19 (2008), the Grand 
Chamber held that a lack of access to legal assistance while the suspect was in police 
detention had disclosed a systemic violation of the ECHR (see Executive summary, 
SPICe Briefing-Criminal Procedure: Responses to Cadder v HM Advocate, page 3, 
available at http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/
S3/SB_11-20.pdf) This case involved a minor who had been subjected to a custodial 
interrogation without the benefit of counsel. During the course of the interrogation, the 
defendant made admissions which he retracted at trial, claiming they were induced by 
coercive tactics by the police. His successful Article 6 claim induced the Lord Advocate 
of Scotland to promulgate “interim guidelines” and later revised guidelines regarding 
access to attorneys during interrogation. Later, in October 2010, the UK Supreme 
Court ruled, in a unanimous opinion, that Scottish law, which permitted the police to 
interrogate suspects in the absence of counsel, was “incompatible” with Article 6 of the 
ECHR: Cadder v. HM Advocate [2010] UKSC 43. Amendments to Scottish legislation 
were then enacted via Criminal Procedure (Legal Assistance, Detention and Appeals) 
(Scotland) Act 2010 , bringing Scotland into compliance with Cadder and the European 
Convention system.
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the ECtHR is increasingly 
seen as delivering «constitutional justice.»1 In general terms, the EC-
tHR should not be confused with a national Supreme Court, or a na-
tional Constitutional Court, as the ECtHR does not possess the authority 
to reverse decisions by national courts or void national laws.2 Although 
final and binding on the State Respondent, the ECtHR does not have 
the authority to review a domestic criminal conviction and set a defen-
dant free. Rather, it is often said that the ECtHR pronounces declaratory 
judgments–i. e. it only states that there was (or there was not) a viola-
tion of a right protected by the ECHR in the domestic realm.3 Further, 
ECtHR rulings are not aimed at condemning a given section of the law 
as «illegal» or «unfair,» as the Court’s decisions are always confined to 
the case brought before its attention. In other words, the Court does not 
assess whether national law was correctly applied or whether national 
law might be contrary to the ECHR system. Instead, the Court’s task 
under the Convention is to ascertain whether the applicant was subject 
to a violation of one of the Convention’s rights in the domestic proceed-
ing brought against him or her.4
On these assumptions, one could conclude that the ECHR regime 
is merely geared to delivering thoughtful assessments on the alleged 
violation (or non-violation) of a given right in a given case. Such con-
clusion, however, would be inaccurate because further steps are called 
for at national level when a violation is found. According to the Con-
vention, members of the Council of Europe bear a duty to ensure an 
effective remedy to any individual who has been a victim of a violation 
of the ECHR for which the State is responsible.5 Whenever the Court 
1 Keller & Stone Sweet, supra note 37, at 703. “No longer does [the Convention] express 
the identity of western European liberal democracy in contrast with the rival communist 
model of central and eastern Europe: it now provides an “’abstract constitutional 
identity’ for the entire continent” according to Greer, supra note 30, at 170–71.
2 The ECtHR has made it clear on several occasions that it does not constitute a further 
court of appeal, i.e. a fourth instance from the decisions of national courts applying 
national law. In the words of the Court, “it is not its function to deal with error of 
fact or law allegedly committed by a national court”. Ruiz v. Spain, 1999-I, Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 87, 28.
3 For more discussion on the nature of ECtHR judgments, with specific regard to Article 
6 claims, see also Harris et Al., supra note 15, at 201–204.
4 To put it differently, the task of the ECtHR in cases concerning criminal evidence is “to 
ascertain whether the proceeding as a whole, including the way in which the evidence 
was taken, were fair” to the applicant. Cf. Kostovski, supra note 40, at ¶ 39.
5 Art. 13 ECHR.
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concludes that there has been a breach of the Convention, the respon-
dent State is under a legal obligation to put an end to the breach and 
make reparations for its consequences in such a way as to restore, as far 
as possible, the situation existing prior to the violation. The Committee 
of Ministers supervises this, as the Court has no authority to directly 
enforce the judgment within the domestic realm.1
In this regard, a quiet revolution has been occurring within the 
discourse on human rights across Europe. For decades, the Commit-
tee’s oversight was limited to ensuring that «just satisfaction,»2 in the 
form of a sum of money, was paid to the applicant who was found to 
be the victim of a violation. More recently, however, the Committee 
of Ministers took a far more active stance in applying Article 46 of the 
ECHR, by virtue of which Member States «undertake to abide by the 
final judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties.»3 The 
1 By virtue of Article 46 para. 2 of the Convention, the task of execution and enforcement 
of judgments falls to the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (see below). 
2 Art. 41 ECHR. Typically, the Strasbourg Court makes awards under three headings: 
costs and expenses, awards for pecuniary damage and awards for non-pecuniary 
damage. The award of a just satisfaction, however, is not a right when a violation is 
found and the ECtHR has frequently decided to hold that the finding of a violation is, 
in itself, sufficient vindication of the applicant’s rights. Cf. Harris et Al., supra note 15, 
at 857.
3 As per Art. 46 of the Convention, the legal obligation to comply with ECHR judgments 
concerns all the authorities within Member States (courts, regions, government 
agencies, etc…). When a final judgment finding a violation of the ECHR is issued, 
the Member State is thus responsible for identifying the relevant domestic authorities 
that should be informed of the judgment, in particular when these authorities are called 
to take execution measures. The Government has then to report to the Committee of 
Ministers (CoM) of the measures envisaged, the domestic authorities involved and the 
foreseeable timetable for adoption of the remedial measures. The CoM is supposed to 
supervise the progression of such measures and, in case of difficulties or delays, to 
seek appropriate solutions in cooperation with the relevant authorities and the State’s 
Delegation. Some violations are thus addressed and possibly resolved by the domestic 
courts, as these gradually align their precedents with the dicta of ECtHR. If the courts 
(or any other domestic authorities) fail to take the necessary measures, the Member 
State’s responsibility is at stake and other domestic authorities might have to intervene 
in order to achieve the expected result: while the State is indeed free, within certain 
limits, to choose the means of execution, it is legally bound to attain the execution result 
required. A good example in this respect is the adoption of legislative measures where 
the expected change of case law did not take place. It should be noted that in States 
where the ECHR and its case law enjoy direct effect and are therefore directly applied by 
the Courts, “it has sometimes been possible to invalidate, through judicial procedures, 
legal provisions that ran contrary to the ECHR” (as reported by the European Court 
of Human Rights, in its own website: http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/execution/
presentation/faq_EN.asp).
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establishment of an effective remedy by the Member State is crucial in 
criminal matters. Since the late 1990s, due to political pressure from the 
Council of Europe1 and increasing public demands for rights-based re-
forms of the criminal justice system, most States have introduced statu-
tory reforms2 of criminal procedure to allow the reopening3 of national 
criminal proceedings after a non-favorable judgment from the ECtHR 
(the only notable exception being Italy).4 This is truly remarkable if one 
1 See CoM, Recommendation No. R (2000)2 ”on the re-examination or reopening of 
certain cases at domestic level following judgments of the EctHR”, in which the CoM 
encouraged the Contracting Parties “to examine their national legal systems with a 
view to ensuring that there exist adequate possibilities of re-examination of the case, 
including reopening of proceedings, in instances where the Court has found a violation 
of the Convention, especially where: (i) the injured party continues to suffer very serious 
negative consequences because of the outcome of the domestic decision at issue, which 
are not adequately remedied by the just satisfaction and cannot be rectified except by 
re-examination or reopening, and (ii) the judgment of the Court leads to the conclusion 
that (a) the impugned domestic decision is on the merits contrary to the Convention, or 
(b) the violation found is based on procedural errors or shortcomings of such gravity 
that a serious doubt is cast on the outcome of the domestic proceedings complained of. 
2 For examples, see the 1998 amendment to §359, German Strafprozessordnung (StPO) 
and the 2000 amendment to Art. 525 of the Greek Criminal Procedural Code. See 
also Art. 122, 2005 Statute of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court; Art. 413 para 4 No. 
2 Russian Criminal Procedural Code; Art. 540 para 3, Polish Criminal Constitutional 
Code; Art. 443, Criminal Procedural Code of Luxemburg; Article 391 No. 2, Code of 
Criminal Procedure of Norway, Art. 406, Criminal Procedural Code of Hungary. In 
France, Statute 516/2000 introduced a specific means of redress termed “Réexamen 
d’une décision pénale consécutif au prononcé d’un arrêt de la Cour européenne 
des droits de l’homme, which is governed by Article 626-1 to 626-7 of the Code de 
procédure pénale; cf. R. De Gouttes, La Procedure de Réexamen des Decisions Pénales 
après un Arrêt de Condamnation de la Cour Européenne des Droits de l’Homme, in 
Libertés, Justice, Tolerance. Mélanges en Homage au Doyen Gérard Cohen-Jonathan 
563 (2004). Elsewhere, steps were taken by the domestic courts so to allow the 
reopening of proceedings based upon existing statutory provisions. In Denmark, for 
instance, following Jersild v. Denmark, 298 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1994) (finding of a 
fair trial violation), the impugned criminal proceedings were reopened under Art. 441 
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, which provides for this possibility in the case of an 
unlawful decision by a national court. 
3 Incidentally, it must be noted that in Gäfgen the applicant did not claim any award for 
pecuniary or non/pecuniary damage (see discussion supra at note 49), and he stressed 
that the only objective of his application was to obtain a retrial before the domestic court 
(cf. ¶ 190).
4 Failure to reopen domestic criminal proceedings following a judgment of violation has 
on some occasions sparked tension between the CoM and the relevant Member State. 
In Hulki Güneş v. Turkey, 2003-VII Eur. Ct. H.R., the applicant had been sentenced to 
death (later commuted to life in prison) and the ECtHR found violations of his right to a 
fair trial on account of the lack of independence and impartiality of the tribunal due to 
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considers that, de facto, the ruling of a panel of essentially «foreign» 
justices–who are appointed to the ECtHR following a nomination by 
foreign governments–may well open the doors to the reversal of a do-
mestic final judgment on matters of law.1 No other international treaty 
has ever triggered the same effect.
Given its widely acknowledged quasi-constitutional standing in 
the post-reform era, the Strasbourg Court functions as an authoritative 
source of rights jurisprudence for all of Europe. Yet, the Court is also 
dramatically influenced by the need to maintain its legitimacy. Its le-
gitimacy may be impaired if the Strasbourg Court finds a violation that 
implies the law in the vast majority of Member States was inconsistent 
with the terms of the Convention. This is the reason why it has tradition-
ally been much easier for the ECtHR to «name and shame» domestic 
practices that fall short of a given European standard than to propose 
progressive measures beyond what is said to be the common practice, if 
any, of Member States.2
the presence of a military judge on the bench (Art. 6, para 1 ECHR) and the impossibility 
for the applicant to examine or to have examined the witnesses who testified against him 
(Art. 6 para 3(d) ECHR). In three separate resolutions (one in 2005 and two in 2007), the 
CoM deplored the fact that the 2003 Turkish statute that provided for the reopening of 
proceedings for human rights violations did not cover cases that were held or pending 
at the ECtHR before 2003. While significant political pressure can be mounted by the 
CoM, compliance by Member States might still prove an insurmountable task in certain 
situations: in Italian criminal procedure, for example, one cannot yet find a remedy to 
reopen a domestic proceeding following a finding of violation in Strasbourg, in spite 
of the “serious concerns” voiced by the Strasbourg bodies (cf. CoE, Interim Resolution 
ResDH (2004) 13, Dorigo v. Italy, App. No. 33286/96). 
1 This is not to argue that the national courts are invariably under an obligation to reverse 
the prior ruling. In broad terms (and subject to domestic specifications), in a reopened 
proceeding national courts must abide by the ruling of the ECtHR on matters of law, 
but they might also have to take into consideration a change of factual circumstances, 
or a different assessment of the evidence, which might be relevant to the case. This 
does not amount to a violation of the ECHR, as it derives from the rather obvious fact 
that “reopened proceedings are not necessarily limited to the grounds which required 
the reopening”; cf. Matthias Hartwig, Much Ado About Human Rights: The Federal 
Constitutional Court Confronts the European Court of Human Rights, 6 GERMAN L.J. 
869, 887 (2005). 
2 In practice, the consequence is that domestic rules may more likely escape condemnation 
if and when they reflect the practice of a majority of the Member States. An example is 
the “judgment in public” clause of Article 6, ECHR, which has been read in a relaxed 
way by the ECtHR, given that most Supreme Courts in civil jurisdictions do not deliver 
orally in open court. See Pretto v. Italy, 71 Eur. Ct. HR. (ser. A)(1983).
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After all, this practice is consistent with the scope of the Conven-
tion, which is to establish a minimum level of protection of rights and 
freedoms across Europe. The significance of ECtHR decisions to the 
Member States is reminiscent of the treatment of United States Su-
preme Court decisions in criminal procedure matters in the fifty U. S. 
states. In the United States, it is accepted that a Supreme Court deci-
sion that recognizes a procedural right of a criminal defendant in the 
federal Bill of Rights provides a «constitutional floor» below which 
state law may not go. When the Supreme Court chooses to cut back on 
a defendant’s constitutional protections, however, a state court is not 
required to follow such a restriction. Each state has a right to interpret 
its own state constitution’s bill of rights (which usually mimic the lan-
guage of the federal Bill of Rights).1 Similarly, a state court can expand 
the protections it provides its criminal suspects beyond the protections 
announced by the Supreme Court by interpreting its own state constitu-
tion more liberally.
1 The “New Federalism” emerged during the 1970’s when state courts began to interpret 
their state Bill of Rights provisions in a way that is more protective of Fourth, Fifth and 
Sixth Amendment rights than the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of those 
same rights set forth in the U.S. Constitution. Justice Brennan expressed his approval 
of this “New Federalism” as early as 1977. Writing in the Harvard Law Review at a 
time when the U.S. Supreme Court was contracting individual rights, Justice Brennan 
wrote: “state courts cannot rest when they have offered their citizens the full protections 
of the federal Constitution. State courts, too, are a fount of individual liberties, their 
protections often extending beyond those required Supreme Court interpretations of 
federal law,” William J. Brennan, State Courts and Protection of Individual Rights, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 489, 491 (1977). The most widespread use of the doctrine has been seen 
in numerous State Supreme Court decisions which have refused to engraft the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s announcement of a “good faith exception” to the exclusionary rule 
(see People v. Bigelow, 488 N.E.2d 451 (N.Y. 1985); State v. Novembrino 519 A.2d 820 
(N.J. 1987); State v. Carter, 370 S.E.2d 553 (N.C. 1988); Commonwealth v. Edmunds, 
586 A.2d 887 (P.A. 1991)). For some of the rich literature on the subject, see, Michael K. 
Schneider, An Exclusionary Rule Colorado Can Call Its Own, 63 U. Colo. L. Rev. 207 
(1992); Katrina Patrick, Autran v. State Fourth Amendment Judicial Independence Et 
Tu Texas, 20 T. Marshall L. Rev. 385 (1995); Carrie Leonetti, Independent and Adequate 
Maryland State Exclusionary Rule for Illegally Obtained Evidence, 38 U. Balt. L. Rev. 
231 (2009); James W. Diehm, New Federalism and Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 
55 Md. L. Rev. 223 (1996); Paul Cassell, The Mysterious Creation of Search and 
Seizure Rules Under State Constitutions and the Utah Example, 1993 Utah L. Rev. 751 
(1993), Sanford E. Pitler, The Origin and Development of Washington’s Independent 
Exclusionary Rule, 61 Wash. L. Rev. 459 (1986); Robert M. Bloom and Hillary Massey, 
Accounting for Federalism in State Courts: Exclusion of Evidence Obtained Lawfully 
by Federal Agents, 79 U. Colo. L. Rev. 381 (2008).
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IV. Mistreatment in the Course of an Interrogation and 
«Means of Redress»
A. «Torture» and «Inhuman Treatment» in European Human 
Rights Law
As mentioned earlier, Gäfgen filed two separate claims before the 
ECtHR. As is the practice in Strasbourg, the claims were jointly ad-
dressed by both Section V in the 2008 opinion and the Grand Chamber 
in the 2010 final ruling.1 The 2008 six-to-one decision announced that 
under Section V of the ECtHR the applicant could no longer claim the 
status of victim of torture and inhuman treatment under Article 3 and 
that his right to a fair trial under Article 6 had not been violated.2 In 
2010, the Grand Chamber partially overturned that decision and stated 
that Gäfgen was indeed still a victim of a violation of Article 3 because 
the German authorities had not provided adequate redress for the vio-
lent conduct of its police officers during interrogation. Nevertheless, at 
the same time, the Grand Chamber denied the claim under Article 6, 
albeit by an unusually slim majority (11-6).3
Although the core of the ECtHR argument on the scope of the 
exclusionary rule in criminal procedure is found in its response to the 
Article 6 claim (trial fairness), the Grand Chamber’s reasoning concern-
ing the Article 3 claim (torture and inhuman treatment) is significant for 
two reasons.
First, the specific characterization of the police misconduct–wheth-
er torture or inhuman treatment–is considered under the Article 3 claim, 
and the ECtHR later attaches major consequences to this distinction. 
Second, the appropriate means of redress for an Article 3 violation at 
the national level is analyzed therein, and this analysis also impacts the 
subsequent holding concerning the scope of the exclusionary rule.
With respect to the qualification of mistreatment, it is undisputed 
that the manner in which the suspect was questioned in the German 
1 At the outset, each individual application addressed to the ECtHR is assigned to one 
of its seven “Sections.” Typically, a Chamber of seven judges within the Section shall 
decide on the admissibility and merits of the applications. Chambers may relinquish 
jurisdiction in favor of the Grand Chamber (under the terms of Art. 30 ECHR) with 
the parties’ consent, which is a rare occurrence. In addition, any party to the case may 
request that a case already decided by a Chamber be referred to the Grand Chamber, in 
terms described above (supra, note 2). This was the case in Gäfgen.
2 Gäfgen, App. No. 22978/05, Judgment of the V Section (30 June 2008), at ¶¶ 82, 109.
3 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at ¶ 49. Although no official data are available on this specific 
matter, the practice of separate opinions (whether concurring or dissenting) is far less 
developed at the ECtHR than in the appellate courts of the United States. 
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police station in 2002 breached Article 3 of the ECHR.1 German courts 
acknowledged that the first confession was obtained through methods 
of coercion, overpowering the will of the accused.2 Significantly, the 
Grand Chamber characterized the methods employed during the custo-
dial interrogation as «inhuman treatment,» rather than «torture.»3 This 
distinction is a crucial aspect of the decision. The related holding on this 
specific issue reads as follows: «the method of interrogation to which 
[the defendant] was subjected in the circumstances of this case was suf-
ficiently serious to amount to inhuman treatment…but…it did not reach 
the level of cruelty required to attain the threshold of torture.»4 Accord-
ing to the Grand Chamber, the fact that the treatment lasted «for only 
approximately ten minutes outweighed the deliberate and immediate 
pain and suffering inflicted on a subject in custody, handcuffed, and in 
an obvious state of vulnerability.»5 The Grand Chamber treated the case 
as an instance of «threat to torture and sexual abuse,» rather than actual 
torture, and thus characterized it as inhuman treatment.6 Although this 
characterization is consistent with ECtHR precedents on the matter,7 the 
1 As explained above (supra note 20), the issue was raised promptly before the competent 
German court and the court acknowledged that the treatment in question amounted to 
an Article 3 violation.
2 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 29.
3 In ECHR case law, the distinction between torture and inhuman treatment is “frequently 
one of degree.” Robin C.A. White & Clare Ovey, The European Convention on Human 
Rights 170 (5th ed. 2010). The U.N. General Assembly’s definition of torture, often 
quoted by the ECtHR, states that “torture constitutes an aggravated and deliberate form 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.” G.A. Res. 3452 (XXX), ¶ 7, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/3452(XXX) (Dec. 9, 1975).
4 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 27.
5 Id. at 26.
6 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at para 108. See also Campbell v. U.K., 48 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. 
A) (1982) at 12 (“To threaten an individual with torture might in some circumstances 
constitute at least inhuman treatment”).
7 In the last decades, ECtHR case law has addressed rather extreme incidents of Article 
3 violations caused by misbehaviors of domestic police forces during the custodial 
interrogations of suspects. Instances of torture include, among others, severe beatings 
over a prolonged period of time (“several hours” in Menesheva v. Russia, 2006-III 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 139); foot whipping (Salman v. Turkey, 2000-VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 365.); 
“Palestinian” hanging (Levinţa v. Moldova, App. No. 17332/03 (2008), and rape during 
custody (Aydin v. Turkey, 1997-VI Eur. Ct. H.R. 1866. In the leading case Selmouni 
v. France, 1999-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 149, a “large number of blows” over two days of 
questioning was regarded as torture. In comparison, in Ribitsch v. Austria, 336 Eur. 
Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1995), a combination of multiple blows and insults fell short of torture 
and was qualified as “inhuman treatment.” Similarly, beatings by the police over a short 
period “of heightened tension and emotions” were qualified as inhuman treatment in 
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novelty of the Gäfgen opinion lies in the consequences drawn from the 
characterization.
Gäfgen is the first ECtHR case in which the distinction between 
the two types of Article 3 conduct–torture and inhuman treatment–had a 
direct impact on the question of the admissibility of the evidence found 
as a result of the violation and on the fairness of the subsequent trial. As 
is explained in more detail in Part V of this Article, it appears that the 
ECtHR might be willing to recognize a rule of exclusion of derivative 
evidence in case of torture because its use would shock the conscience 
of a court. However, the ECtHR took the view that the shock-the-con-
science reasoning would not automatically apply to «mere» inhuman 
treatment even though admitting such derivative evidence would give 
legitimacy to morally reprehensible behaviour. This is true despite the 
fact that inhuman mistreatment is encompassed in Article 3, which is 
generally referred to as fundamental and is considered to enshrine one 
of the foundational and non-derogable values of democratic societies.1 
Moreover, the European Convention treats the entire provision of Ar-
ticle 3 as non-derogable even in time of emergency and fundamental to 
the European concept of human rights.2 «Disturbing» as it might have 
appeared to some of the dissenters,3 the distinction between torture and 
inhuman treatment turns out to be one of the key factors that led the 
Grand Chamber to approve the German court’s use the poisoned fruits 
of Gäfgen’s coerced confession.
In fairness, the temptation to selectively apply an exclusionary rule 
based on the nature of a constitutional violation is not uncommon. In the 
United States, for instance, some constitutional rights receive greater 
protection than others. For example, a coerced (involuntary) confession, 
or its derivative fruits, cannot be used for any purpose, including wit-
Egmez v. Cyprus, 2000-XII Eur. Ct. H.R. 315. Admittedly, the pain inflicted upon the 
defendant in the Gäfgen case was less severe than in the cases of Egmez and Ribitsch.
1 A. Ashworth, The Exclusion of Evidence Obtained by Violating a Fundamental Right: 
Pragmatism Before Principle in the Strasbourg Jurisprudence, in Criminal Evidence 
and Human Rights - Reimagining Common Law Procedural Traditions (P. Roberts & J. 
Hunter eds., 2012) 147.
2 Art. 15 para 2 lists the non-derogable provisions of the ECHR: Article 2 (right to life, 
except in respect of death resulting from lawful acts of war), Article 3 (prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment), Article 4 para 1 (prohibition 
of slavery) and Article 7 (no punishment without law).Convention for the Protection of 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 15, Nov. 4, 1950, E.T.S. 005.
3 See Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 49 (Joint Partly Dissenting opinion of Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power). 
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ness impeachment.1 However, a confession resulting from a «Miranda 
violation» without threats or abuse may yield admissible fruits and can 
be used to impeach the defendant’s credibility.2 The prosecution’s fail-
ure to produce exculpatory evidence is never considered harmless and 
always leads to an automatic reversal,3 while the admission of a coerced 
or Miranda-violating confession can amount to a harmless error in the 
face of other overwhelming and untainted evidence of guilt.4
As outlined infra in Part III, the ECHR system requires all ap-
plicants to seek relief primarily in the domestic realm, while resort to 
the Strasbourg Court is permissible only after all domestic remedies 
have been «exhausted,» a term that accounts for any effective means of 
redress at the domestic level. The question was not whether Gäfgen was 
subjected to a human rights violation during interrogation, but whether 
he later lost his victim status because such violation might theoretically 
have been redressed by the German authorities. In fact, when adequate 
redress is offered at the national level5 the «victim» requirement under 
Article 34 of the ECHR is no longer satisfied thereby and the applicant 
lacks standing before the ECtHR.6
Traditionally, the ECtHR’s assessment of the adequacy of the re-
dress is performed on a case-by-case basis and applies a totality-of-
the-circumstances standard.7 In Article 3 cases, the Strasbourg Court 
has repeatedly held that two measures are necessary to provide suffi-
cient redress. First, the Member State authorities must have concluded 
a thorough and effective investigation leading to the identification and 
appropriate punishment of those state actors responsible.8 Secondly, an 
effective compensation procedure must be made available to the ap-
plicant, such that he or she may recover damages for the mistreatment 
suffered.9
1 Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
2 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
3 Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
4 Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279 (1991).
5 In practice, this may occur through successful appeals or a subsequent court decision 
that acknowledges the violation and provides an effective “remedy.”
6 For more discussion on the victim requirement in ECHR law see Pieter van Dijk & 
G.J.H. van Hoof, Theory and Practice of the European Convention on Human Rights 
46-60 (3 ed., 1998).
7 Eckle v. Germany, 51 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 30 (1982).
8 Çamdereli v. Turkey, App. No. 28433/02 (2008), at ¶¶ 28-29.
9 Vladimir Romanov v. Russia, App. No. 41461/02 (2008) at ¶ 79.
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In Gäfgen, the Grand Chamber was not persuaded that the Ger-
man authorities had provided an adequate response in order to remedy 
the mistreatment of the defendant. More specifically, the ECtHR found 
shortcomings especially with regard to the first requirement. The Grand 
Chamber accepted that the investigation and proceedings against the 
police officers were sufficiently prompt and expeditious and that re-
sponsibilities were eventually established. However, the «token» fines 
imposed against the police officers were regarded as manifestly dis-
proportionate to a breach of one of the core rights of the Convention.1 
The leniency in both criminal and disciplinary sanction was regarded as 
lacking «the necessary deterrent effect in order to prevent further prohi-
bition of ill-treatment in future difficult situations.»2
«Remarkably, the Grand Chamber majority’s argument that the 
loss of victim status under Article 3 depends on the severity of the pen-
alty» against the police officers led to strong dissents from both the 
«hardliner» champions of the «public interest»3 and the most progres-
sive supporters of individual rights.4 Against a backdrop of case law that 
treats sentencing as a matter to be left to the margin of appreciation of 
domestic authorities,5 the hardliners wondered «what degree of punish-
ment the ECtHR should accept in order to find that the applicant is no 
longer a victim.»6 By contrast, the Grand Chamber’s progressive minor-
ity argued for the application of the exclusionary rule to the illegally ob-
tained item as the only adequate means of redress capable of preventing 
the Convention rights from becoming theoretical and illusory.7
In essence, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR did not rule out the 
possibility that, based upon a case-by-case assessment, exclusion of the 
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 6.
2 Id. at 33 In addition to the ECtHR’s dissatisfaction with the (extremely-bias?) lenient 
sanctions imposed by the German courts, the ECtHR was also concerned with the fact 
that Gäfgen’s compensation claim and the preliminary action to attain legal aid for that 
claim had taken more than three years to be addressed in Germany. 
3 Id. at 56 (partly dissenting opinion of Casadevall, J., joined by Kovler, Mijović, Jaeger, 
Jočienė and López Guerra, JJ.)
4 Id. at 49 (joint partly concurring opinion of Tulkens, Ziemele and Bianku, JJ.)
5 On the “margin of appreciation” doctrine see the landmark case, Handyside v. United 
Kingdom, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at ¶¶ 47–48 (1976). For insights into the doctrine see 
Harris et al., supra note 15, at 11; Howard Charles Yourow, The Margin of Appreciation 
Doctrine in the Dynamics of European Human Rights Jurisprudence (1996).
6 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 56 (partly dissenting opinion of Casadevall, J., joined by Kovler, 
Mijoviæ, Jaeger, Jočienė and López Guerra, JJ.)
7 Id. at 49
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evidence might occasionally be a necessary means of redress in cases 
«in which the deployment of a method of investigation led to disadvan-
tages» for the applicant.1 Yet, it is hard to imagine a case more suitable 
than Gäfgen for drawing such a conclusion, since all the items of physi-
cal evidence available to the prosecutors in Gäfgen were the derivative 
product of the earlier confession obtained through coercion.
B. Redress for Illegally Obtained Evidence in the U. S. System
The notion that exclusion of the evidence is the only effective 
means of redress for a constitutional violation has been developed over 
five decades of U. S. Supreme Court jurisprudence. The Grand Cham-
ber’s progressive group of dissenters appeared to rely on this.
In Mapp v. Ohio, the Supreme Court announced that the exclu-
sionary rule for illegally obtained evidence (in that case, the product of 
an illegal search and seizure) must be applied by state as well as fed-
eral courts.2 Prior to Mapp, the Court had required only that both state 
and federal courts exclude coerced confessions.3 After Mapp, the Court 
extended the exclusionary rule to Miranda-violating confessions,4 post-
formal charge confessions obtained by police in the absence of counsel 
and waiver, unduly suggestive or post-indictment interrogations with-
out counsel, line-ups, and show-ups.5
In Mapp (and earlier in Elkins v. United States6), the Court rec-
ognized two distinct rationales to support the exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence. 7
First, the Court stated that exclusion preserves «judicial integrity»–i. 
e., it avoids the unconscionable and unseemly participation by a court 
in admitting evidence obtained in violation of the constitutional law 
it is sworn to uphold. According to the Court in Mapp, «Nothing can 
1 Id. at 33.
2 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
3 See Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 287 (1936).
4 Miranda, 384 U.S. 436 (Supreme Court ruled that exclusionary rule forbids admission 
of statements obtained in custodial interrogation in the absence of warning and waiver 
of rights).
5 See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (the Court ruled that the exclusionary 
rule forbids admission of post-indictment confessions obtained in the absence of 
counsel and waiver); Stoval v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967) (excluded evidence of police 
identification procedures which are unduly and unnecessarily suggestive); United States 
v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (Court excludes post-indictment line-up obtained in the 
absence of counsel and waiver).
6 364 U.S. 206, 222 (1960).
7 Mapp, 367 U.S. at 659.
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destroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own 
laws, or worse, its disregard of the charter of its own existence.»1 Sec-
ond, the Supreme Court identified a «deterrence» rationale, finding the 
only effective deterrent to police violating the Constitution is both the 
threat and reality of exclusion from trial.2 In supporting the deterrence 
rationale, the Court flatly rejected the notion that (1) a generally illusory 
civil damage remedy, (2) public outrage at the police behavior, or (3) 
internal police administrative discipline would have any meaningful de-
terrent effect.3 In later cases, namely United States v. Calandra,4 Stone v. 
Powell,5 and United States v. Janis,6 the Court essentially abandoned the 
«judicial integrity» argument in favor of Mapp’s other stated rationale, 
i. e., deterrence.
As to the first aspect, common sense and experience dictate that 
it is nearly impossible to obtain a civil damage award in favor of a 
convicted criminal against overzealous police officers who successfully 
uncovered serious wrongdoing in an improper manner.7 This could per-
haps be less of a concern in Europe, where most trials against police of-
ficers would be held before professional judges as opposed to juries. In 
addition, in the United States, most police officers and supervisors are 
generally hostile to rules of exclusion because these rules are thought 
to «handcuff the police.»8 Officers are even promoted based on their 
«clearance rate» (calculated by deciding if «we got the right guy,» rath-
er than conviction rates).9
1 Id. at 660.
2 Mapp, 367 U.S at 656.
3 In Mapp, the Court, announcing that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is 
applicable in state prosecutions, took special note of the fact that the experience in 
various states of using remedies other than exclusion had proved “worthless and futile.” 
Id. at 654.
4 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
5 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
6 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976).
7 The Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution codifies the right to a jury trial in 
almost all civil cases. Although the civil jury right is not incorporated to the states, most 
states provide for jury trials in civil proceedings of any significance. Ordinarily, police 
officers sued for civil damages would demand trial by jury.
8 Samuel Walker & Charles Katz, The Police in America, (7th ed. 2011) McGraw Hill 
at 478.
9 Charles Wellford & James Cronin, Clearing up Homicide Clearance Rates, National 
Institute of Justice Journal, Apr. 2000, at 3.
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V. The European Approach to the Exclusionary Rule: Afford-
ing the Cloak of Law to Coerced Confessions
As opposed to the current United States view of the exclusionary 
rule, which turns entirely on a deterrence rationale, the question of ex-
clusion in Strasbourg was about fair trial rights; in other words, whether 
the use of evidence obtained as a direct or indirect result of a violation 
of Article 3 in the subsequent criminal trial would deprive the defend-
ant of a fair trial under the terms of Article 6. Difficult as the Gäfgen 
case was, it presented the Grand Chamber with a clear opportunity to 
rule upon the exclusionary rule with respect to any derivative means of 
proof obtained by a breach of Article 3. The ECtHR could have defini-
tively answered the question by asserting that «irrespective of the con-
duct of the accused, fairness presupposes respect for the rule of law and 
requires, as a self evident proposition, the exclusion of any evidence 
that has been obtained in violation of Article 3.»1 This was not how the 
court ruled, however. The ECtHR’s failure to draw a bright-line rule on 
the fruits of coerced confessions casts serious doubts on the fundamen-
tal structure of the Convention system, notably in relation to the ability 
of the Strasbourg Court to impact Article 6-related matters.
Admittedly, there are only a few general principles of criminal 
evidence in ECHR law. The ECHR does not lay down a comprehensive 
set of rules for the admissibility of evidence in criminal proceedings 
and the Strasbourg Court systematically refers back to national laws for 
questions of admissibility. An oft-repeated assertion is that the admis-
sibility of evidence «is primarily a matter for regulation under national 
law» and that it is not the role of the Court to determine in abstracto 
whether specific items of evidence may be excluded.2 ECtHR prece-
dents also state that, given the need to assess trial fairness on the basis 
of all the circumstances of the case, there may well be significance in 
determining whether the evidence under scrutiny played a decisive or 
marginal role in securing the conviction of the defendant at the domes-
tic level.3 That being said, the ECtHR will not generally review the as-
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 51 (Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power). 
2 See generally, Schenk v. Switzerland, 140 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 29 (1988), para. 45; 
Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1451, 1462, para. 34; Gäfgen, 
supra note 2, para. 162.
3 For example, the ECtHR rulings on the right to confrontation (Article 6 para 3(d) 
ECHR) are heavily influenced by arguments of corroboration. The use in evidence 
of non-confronted statements from absent, anonymous or vulnerable witnesses is far 
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sessment of the evidence by a national court, only doing so where the 
national court has drawn an «arbitrary or grossly unfair conclusion from 
the facts submitted to it.»1
Nonetheless, a number of ECtHR cases suggest that the use of 
confessions obtained as a direct result of violence, brutality or any other 
conduct that could be characterized either as torture or inhuman treat-
ment always render the subsequent trial unfair.2 Notably, this finding 
applies irrespective of whether such evidence has been decisive in se-
curing the domestic conviction of the applicant. In 2008, for example, 
the ECtHR specified that self incriminatory statements resulting from 
torture (in a case involving «Palestinian hanging»)3 do «fall within the 
category of statements which should never be admissible in criminal 
proceedings since use of such evidence would make such proceedings 
unfair as a whole, regardless of whether the courts also relied on other 
evidence.»4
In 2006, the ECtHR nearly established a per se rule of exclusion 
in dicta in Jalloh v. Germany. In Jalloh, the German authorities forcibly 
administered an emetic to obtain drugs the defendant had swallowed.5 
In the Court’s view, the extent of the intrusion into the defendant’s right 
to self-determination was sufficient cause for a finding of violation:
more acceptable when the ECtHR is satisfied that such statements were not the “only or 
main evidence against the accused”: see generally, Unterpertinger v. Austria, 110 Eur. 
Ct H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986) para. 33 (out-of-court statements from absent witnesses); 
Doorson v. the Netherlands, App. No. 20524/92, 22 Eur. H.R. Rep. 330, 360 (1996), 
para. 76 (pre-trial statements from multiple anonymous witnesses); Lucà v. Italy, 2001-
II Eur. Ct. H.R. 167, 179, para. 43 (out-of-court statements of absent codefendant); 
P.S. v. Germany, App. No. 33900/96, 36 Eur. H.R. Rep. 61 (2003) (hearsay evidence 
concerning allegations made by a vulnerable witness). For a comprehensive discussion 
of the confrontation clause in ECHR law see Stefano Maffei, The European Right to 
Confrontation in Criminal Proceedings 61-94 (2006).
1 Waldberg v. Turkey, App. No. 22909/93, 1995 (Eur. Comm’n on H.R.), para. 2.
2 Jalloh v. Germany, supra note 4, para. 105.
3 It is well-known that “Palestinian hanging” is a form of torture in which the prisoner 
or victim is lifted off the ground by a rope attached to the wrists, which have been tied 
behind the back, and then dropped partway to the ground. This could possibly lead 
to massive pain and suffering, alongside with the dislocation of both shoulders when 
the muscles can no longer take the strain: Barbra Ramos, Christopher DuPuis, Dennis 
Galvin, Eiman Zolfaghari, Sean David Cardeno Interrogation and Torture White 
Paper Team Report for Project 2 (University of Washington, Seattle & University of 
California, Berkeley) (2005). 
4 Levinţa v. Moldova, App. No. 17332/03 (see above note 67), para. 104 (emphasis 
added).
5 Jalloh v. Germany, supra note 4, para. 11.
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«[I] ncriminating evidence–whether in the form of a confession 
or real evidence–obtained as a result of acts of violence or brutality or 
other forms of treatment which can be characterized as torture should 
never be relied on as proof of the victim’s guilt, irrespective of its pro-
bative value. Any other conclusion would only serve to legitimate in-
directly the sort of morally reprehensible conduct which the authors of 
Article 3 of the Convention sought to proscribe or…to «afford brutality 
the cloak of law.»1
In the Court’s view, the use at trial of the illegally obtained evi-
dence, specifically the drug, amounted to a per se violation of the fair-
ness clause of Article 6 of the ECHR, thus Germany was found in 
breach of the European Convention. The Jalloh opinion appeared to use 
a pure judicial integrity rationale, which would imply a per se rule of 
exclusion for illegally obtained evidence.
On closer inspection, however, Jalloh does not implicate the «poi-
sonous fruit» doctrine at all. Although this case is often quoted as a 
«fruits case» in ECtHR precedents,2 this is misleading. The drugs re-
covered were the direct product of the brutality and not the derivative 
evidence resulting from its exploitation. Jalloh was simply a case where 
the domestic court admitted evidence that was the direct object of the 
mistreatment. Had the emetic also produced a document with an ad-
dress of a secret stash of drugs that the police would not have otherwise 
discovered, the stash would be considered the «fruit» of the poisonous 
tree, but this was not the case in Jalloh. The fact that Jalloh involved 
a physical search of the defendant as opposed to an interrogation is a 
distinction without a difference for «fruits of poisonous tree» analysis 
purposes.
Despite the lack of a real distinction between the product of an 
illegal interrogation and the product of an illegal search, the reasoning 
in Jalloh introduced a European doctrine in which a flawed distinction 
was drawn between «confessions» and «real (physical) evidence», as 
if the latter were always to be regarded as «fruits.» In the opinion of 
the ECtHR, evidence of confessions or admissions obtained through a 
breach of Article 3 (whether in case of torture or inhuman treatment) are 
inadmissible while real evidence obtained only through torture would 
automatically be excluded as unfair. This leaves totally unanswered the 
1 Id. at para. 105. 
2 See, e.g., Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 42
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question of the use in evidence of the derivative «fruits», which eventu-
ally became relevant in Gäfgen.
As explained above, the majority of ECtHR judges in the 2008 rul-
ing used Gäfgen to draw a major distinction in terms of evidence ad-
missibility depending upon whether the police illegality amounted to 
«torture» or «inhuman treatment.» By characterizing the conduct of 
the police during the interrogation as «inhuman treatment,» Section V 
aligned itself with the dicta in Jalloh, which left the door open to the 
admission of physical evidence found as a consequence of inhuman 
treatment. That view is now endorsed by the Grand Chamber’s opinion, 
which explicitly confines the automatic exclusion of physical evidence 
only to cases in which the underlying acts of violence are characterized 
as «torture.»1
According to the Grand Chamber, in cases of inhuman treatment 
such as Gäfgen, courts should make a case-by-case assessment of the 
relationship of the impugned evidence and the finding of guilt against 
the accused.2 One could expect that where, as in Gäfgen, the evidence 
obtained illegally was so critical to the finding of guilt there would be 
little room for the Court to rule that the relationship between the illegal 
evidence and the finding of guilt was insignificant.
In similar cases, the ECtHR would look at the direct or circum-
stantial evidence along with the tainted items to determine if the es-
sence of the «right to a fair trial» was violated as well as to assess if the 
applicant had an opportunity to challenge the evidence against him.3 In 
Gäfgen, there was actually no separately obtained evidence linking the 
applicant to the death of the kidnapped child. In listing the allegedly un-
1 Id.; see also Gäfgen, Judgment of the V Section, supra note 59, at para. 99. The ECtHR 
mischaracterization of “real evidence” as “fruits”, however, leaves the reader puzzled as 
to whether the ECtHR will be prepared to exclude the “derivative” evidence in torture 
cases. No such occurrence has yet been brought to the Strasbourg Court. 
2 In Gäfgen, the issue of the weight (or “quality”) of the evidence appears crucial in 
the eyes of the ECtHR. In this respect, the Grand Chamber opinion slightly moved 
away from the reasoning of the V Section of the ECtHR in the 2008 ruling. Therein, 
four distinct parameters had been laid down as concurring criteria in determine trial 
fairness. They were:“… a) the manner in which the real evidence was found; b) the 
circumstances established by untainted evidence; c) the weight attached to the impugned 
items of evidence and d) whether the applicant’s defence rights were respected, notably 
the opportunity for him to challenge the admission and use of such evidence at his trial.” 
(see Gäfgen, Judgment of the V Section, supra note 59, para 105). 
3 Khan v. the United Kingdom, App. No 47486/06, 31 Eur. H.R. Rep. 1016, 1026 (2010), 
paras. 35-37 (a case concerning the admissibility in evidence obtained by means of a 
listening device in breach of Article 8 ECHR).
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tainted evidence in the case the Grand Chamber mentions the blackmail 
letter, a note found in the applicant’s flat concerning the planning of the 
kidnapping, and the ransom money.1 All of the physical evidence relat-
ed to the offence of murder was obtained by means of the first coerced 
confession. That «even without [the applicant’s] confession on the day 
of the trial, there had been ample evidence to prove the applicant guilty 
at least of kidnapping with extortion»2 is the German court’s implicit 
acknowledgement that a finding of guilt on the specific count of murder 
could not be secured on the basis of the untainted evidence.3
The second full confession Gäfgen rendered at trial must be placed 
in the practical context of a criminal proceeding for a serious crime. The 
facts of the case make clear that Gäfgen made his second confession 
only after the court had dismissed his request to exclude the evidence 
obtained in violation of Article 3.4 Having already admitted the damn-
ing physical evidence derived from Gäfgen’s first stationhouse confes-
sion, it is striking that the Court completely overlooked the obvious 
reason for Gäfgen’s admission of guilt at trial. After Gäfgen was faced 
with the physical evidence, he reasonably would have believed that the 
«cat was out of the bag,»5 that he had nothing to lose by confessing 
again, and that he could potentially secure a reduced sentence by taking 
responsibility for the crime.6
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 44.
2 Id. at 34.
3 Id. at 26. There is in fact a major difference between the punishment prescribed in German 
criminal law for kidnapping for extortion and murder aggravated by premeditation, in 
respect of which the applicant was first charged and then sentenced.
4 Id. at 10.
5 The “cat out of the bag” metaphor was first employed judicially in the United States 
Supreme Court in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 314-315 (1985) and more recently in 
Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 615 (2004). The metaphor captures the situation where 
a suspect confesses in a custodial interrogation setting without Miranda warnings and 
then after being warned, confesses again. Because the suspect does not know that the 
first confession is inadmissible at trial, he believes the later warnings are meaningless 
since the “cat is already out of the bag” and believing he has already incriminated 
himself, sees no point in later remaining silent. In Seibert, where the Supreme Court 
found that this “question first, warn later” interrogation process was intentional, the 
second confession was held inadmissible.
6 In Germany, as in most European jurisdictions, courts of criminal law deliberate at once 
on fact, law and sentence. Since no separate phase for sentencing exists, evidence of 
mitigating (and aggravating) factors is thus introduced in the course of the trial of first 
instance
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Since all of the Gäfgen evidence was tainted, this would have been 
the perfect case in which to announce a fruit of the poisonous tree doc-
trine for Europe. The Grand Chamber’s failure to do so on these facts 
would appear to be an implicit rejection of the doctrine. In the United 
States, where the courts have dealt with consecutive confessions, it 
has been argued under the deterrence rationale that once the suspect 
confesses under illegal means but is not aware that such confession is 
inadmissible, the «cat is out of the bag,» and the second confession is 
the fruit of the first. If the second confession is not excluded then police 
have an incentive to violate the defendant’s rights in the first instance 
(knowing the first confession cannot be used in court) and then to take 
advantage of the existence of the first confession to obtain the second. 
The United States Supreme Court ruled accordingly in Missouri v. Seib-
ert, where it found the police action in violating Miranda was deliber-
ately taken to obtain the second confession.1
If the Grand Chamber had adopted a fruit of the poisonous tree 
analysis in Gäfgen, it would have made sense to add to the doctrine the 
exception for «inevitable discovery» by the police. In the case of Nix v. 
Williams, the United States Supreme Court announced its acceptance of 
the «inevitable discovery» exception to the exclusionary rule. The ex-
ception provides that if the government can show that the police would 
have inevitably discovered by lawful means the evidence it recovered 
illegally, the evidence would be admissible despite the Constitutional 
violation.2 In Gäfgen, though, nothing in the opinion suggests that the 
corpse of the victim or the tire track would have been inevitably dis-
covered in another way. Nothing indicates that the German police in-
vestigators were on their way to the place of burial or that any other act 
of investigation–made at the time or at a later stage in the proceeding–
could have linked the missing boy, or the alleged defendant, with the 
1 542 U.S. 600, 616 (2004).
2 Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 446 (1984). In this case, the prosecution obtained the 
body of the murder victim in a rural area of Iowa by means of illegally eliciting a 
statement from Williams in violation of his right to counsel. Because, however, a joint 
police-citizen search party was underway at the time of the discovery of the body and 
because according to the searchers protocol, they would have found the body anyway 
within a short time in freezing temperatures, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the 
evidence would have been discovered inevitably by legal means in the same condition, 
for forensic purposes, irrespective of the violation of the constitutional right to counsel. 
Thus, according to the Supreme Court, the admission of the evidence despite the 
violation put the prosecution in no better position than it would have been absent the 
violation.
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pond in Birstein. The pond is in fact located 100 kilometers away from 
the city of Frankfurt, in which the defendant was arrested and had his 
place of residence.1
Regardless, the Grand Chamber found that the domestic trial 
against Gäfgen as a whole had been fair because the breach of Article 
3 of the Convention did not have a bearing on the conviction and sen-
tence.2 This is one of the most perplexing and unconvincing holdings in 
the recent history of the Strasbourg Court. In the majority’s view, there 
was a break in the causal chain leading from the prohibited method of 
investigation to the applicant’s conviction, and such break was caused 
by the second confession. Instead, the «impugned real evidence was not 
necessary, and was not used to prove…guilt or determine…sentence.»3 
Specifically, the ECtHR accepted the domestic court’s argument that 
the physical evidence in question was not presented as proof of fact but 
merely to test the veracity of the second confession.4 This is a very odd 
rationale for admitting the physical evidence at Gäfgen’s trial. After all, 
the physical evidence was obtained only through the first inadmissible 
confession. If the second, in-court confession was not, as the Grand 
Chamber ruled, the poisoned fruit of the first illegal confession, then 
it was «legally» obtained. Thus, the defendant’s in-court confession 
stood unchallenged and there was absolutely no need to corroborate 
or verify it. Furthermore, corroborative evidence is offered to prove its 
substantive truth. There is no evidentiary concept of offering additional 
evidence of an unchallenged key fact for any other purpose. Indeed, 
notions of «limited admissibility» are foreign to the civil law, at least 
where professional judges, rather than lay jurors, find the facts.5
Furthermore, it is not the practice of the ECtHR to accept at face 
value the domestic authorities’ arguments on whether certain items of 
evidence were used, or not. In the 2007 Harutyunyan case, the applicant, 
1 No notice was paid either by the V Section or the Grand Chamber in Gäfgen to the 
attempt made by the German Government to invoke the “inevitable discovery” exception 
to the exclusionary rule, through the unsubstantiated (and blunt) assertion that “… it was 
more than likely that [the child]’s corpse and further items of evidence would have been 
found at a later stage anyway”; cf. Gäfgen, Judgment of the V Section, supra note 59, 
para. 92.
2 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 47.
3 Id. at 46.
4 Id. 
5 For a comprehensive introduction on the different arrangements in the laws of criminal 
evidence in civil and common law Countries, see Albin Eser, Collection and Evaluation 
of Evidence in a Comparative Perspective, 31 Isr. L. Rev. 429 (1997).
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a member of the Armenian army on the Azerbaijan border, was accused 
of killing a fellow serviceman with whom he had argued.1 During inter-
rogation, the applicant was punched, kicked, and hit with rubber clubs, 
in addition to having his fingernails squeezed by pliers.2 Although the 
Armenian government attempted to argue that the confession was not 
used in evidence, the Strasbourg Court found that the trial was unfair 
even though the domestic court records merely mentioned the illegally 
obtained evidence in their opinions.3 In comparison, in Gäfgen there 
were countless references to the impugned items in the opinions of the 
German courts,4 leaving one to wonder how a corpse in a murder case 
could be regarded as bearing no impact on the related findings of fact.
Finally, as the dissent puts it, the construct of the break in the 
causal nexus leading from the prohibited method of interrogation to the 
applicant’s conviction is simply «unrealistic» given the circumstances.5 
From the moment of the arrest to the handing down of the sentence, a 
European criminal proceeding is an interconnected whole that cannot 
be compartmentalized. An event that occurs at one stage is often crucial 
at another. This approach has previously been confirmed and endorsed 
by the Grand Chamber, especially in consideration of the importance of 
a correct investigatory process to the fairness of the subsequent trial. In 
Salduz v. Turkey (which involved restrictions on the applicant’s lawyer 
while the applicant was in custody), the ECtHR found that neither the 
legal assistance provided at a later stage nor the adversarial nature of 
the proceeding could cure the defect that had occurred during the time 
spent in police custody.6 Indeed, the dissenters in Gäfgen referenced 
Salduz, writing, «If that is so when considering a breach of the right to 
consult a lawyer, then surely the same reasoning must apply with even 
greater force when confronted with a breach,» of a non-derogable right 
such as Article 3.7
1 Harutyunyan, 49 Eur. H.R. Rep. 9, 204 (2009),  7. 
2 Id.  6-11.
3 Id.  41. 
4 See, e.g., Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 42-43, 45.
5 Id. at 53 (Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, 
Bianku and Power). 
6 See supra note 42.
7 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 52 (Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power). 
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VI. The Rationale of the Grand Chamber: «Unspoken Con-
cerns» in Public Interest Cases before the ECtHR
No bright-line rule is established in Gäfgen to govern the use in 
evidence of the fruits of coerced confessions. The ECtHR did not make 
a finding of trial unfairness in the case, based upon its assessment of 
the totality of the circumstances. Unfortunately, that ruling clashes with 
the overwhelming probative value of the fruits obtained as a result of 
the applicant’s first coerced confession. As an immediate consequence, 
Gäfgen may no longer invoke a retrial at domestic level, in spite of the 
acknowledged breach of Article 3 of the Convention. Given the weak-
ness of the Court’s «compartmentalized» reasoning in determining 
whether to exclude real evidence against Gäfgen, one is led to look for 
alternative–if unspoken–explanations for the Court’s opinion.
This article argues that the Grand Chamber was guided in Gäfgen 
by major «unspoken concerns» over a) the maintenance of legitimacy 
of the European Human Rights mechanism and b) the perceived injus-
tice of excluding reliable evidence in the context of a serious criminal 
proceeding that would instead require a «balancing» of the allegedly 
«competing» interests at stake.
A. Maintaining Legitimacy in the Face of the Absence of «Fruits 
of the Poisonous Tree Rule» in Domestic European Criminal Proce-
dures
On the issue of legitimacy, readers must be reminded that an inter-
pretation of the ECHR that deviates substantially from general European 
practice is bound to undermine the loyalty of States to the Convention 
system and thereby threaten its continued success or acceptance by the 
States.1 As an indirect corollary, in the absence of a European consensus 
the ECtHR has often tended to reflect national law by applying a lowest 
common denominator approach.2 Furthermore, where a Member State’s 
law or conduct is consistent with the practice or law in numerous other 
Member States, or where the law or practices among the Member States 
vary widely, the ECHR often avoids finding a violation.3 This is not to 
deny that the ECtHR has, on some occasions, acted positively in the 
interests of protecting human rights.4 In the area of criminal procedure, 
1 Stephanos Stavros, The Guarantees for Accused Persons under Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, 346 (1993). 
2 Harris et Al., supra note 15, at 9. 
3 Harris et Al., supra note 15, at 10.
4 This was the case, for instance, with regard to the protection of the rights of transsexuals. 
Compare Sheffield and Horsham v. U.K, 27 Eur. H.R. Rep. 163 (1998) (in which the 
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however, diversity among states is greater than in other fields, and the 
ECtHR has often aligned its precedents to the practice of most Member 
States. For example, the ECtHR has held consistent with the law in a 
vast majority of Member States that it is not in breach of Article 6 for 
the criminal court to be informed of the prior record of the defendant1 or 
for a conviction to be founded solely on circumstantial evidence.2
It is not within the scope of this Article to investigate the cur-
rent state of the domestic procedural law in the European countries, 
but nearly all of them do not operate exclusionary rules for derivative 
fruits of constitutional illegalities.3 As a result, if the European Court of 
Human Rights had applied a more stringent fruits standard in Gäfgen, 
this would have implied that the trials in most European Countries were 
unfair with respect to this matter.
The civil law has evolved a number of statutory principles regard-
ing exclusion of evidence, but the principle of material truth has tradi-
tionally minimized their importance in the practice of criminal trials, 
especially with regard to items of physical evidence.4 The reason is that 
most statutory grounds for exclusions were introduced to ensure the 
quality of the evidence. As a result, they do not operate when the breach 
has no impact on the probative value of the item that is found as a result 
of the violation. For example, most systems do not establish an absolute 
link between an illegal search and the seizure of the object at which 
it was aimed. This is because domestic criminal courts are reluctant 
to reject an item of solid evidence (such as an incriminating physical 
evidence found at the defendant’s home) for the sole reason that it was 
illegally obtained.5 The courts’ views are that such items existed «in 
Court’s judgment laid emphasis on the lack of a common European approach) with 
Goodwin v. U.K., 35 Eur. H.R. Rep. 18 (2002) (in which the Court, despite the lack of a 
common European approach, made a finding of violation against the Respondent State 
based upon a “continuing international trend in favour of . . . [the] legal recognition of 
the new sexual identity of post-operative transsexuals”).
1 X. v. Austria, App. No. 1706/62, 1966 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 112 (Eur. Comm’n 
on H.R.): “it is clear that in a number of [Member States] information as to previous 
convictions is regularly given during the trial before the court has reached a decision 
as to the guilt of an accused .....[and the Strasbourg organs are] not prepared to consider 
such a procedure as violating any provision of Art. 6 ECHR, not even in cases where a 
jury is to decide on the guilt of an accused” (p. 34).
2 Alberti v. Italy, 10 March 1989, App. No. 12013/86, 59 DR 100 (1989).
3 For a full comparative account on this matter, see Thaman, supra note 11, at 333-53.
4 Id.
5 The expression “solid evidence” is employed in J. R. Spencer, Evidence, in European 
Criminal Procedures 594, 605 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J. R. Spencer eds., 2002).
233
nature» before the violation was committed and were not «generated» 
by the violation, as opposed to an incriminating conversation obtained 
by means of an illegal listening device.
Even in the bastion of the adversarial tradition, England and 
Wales, no general rule of exclusion applies to the fruits of illegalities, 
as courts are given «broad and unstructured» discretion on this matter.1 
More specifically, [i] n any proceedings the court may refuse to allow 
evidence on which the prosecution proposes to rely to be given if it ap-
pears to the court that, having regard to all the circumstances, including 
the circumstances in which the evidence was obtained, the admission of 
the evidence would have such an adverse effect on the fairness of the 
proceedings that the court ought not to admit it.2
The current statutory provision aligns with the traditional com-
mon law rule according to which «[i] t matters not how you get it; if you 
steal it even, it would be admissible in evidence.»3
It comes as no surprise that, in this context, the European Court of 
Human Rights was reluctant to affirm a bright-line rule of exclusion as 
this would have likely engendered the hostility of continental legisla-
tors. The more the Strasbourg Court strays from principles generally 
accepted among the member states, the more those states will question 
the legitimacy of the Court.
B. «Proportionality» and Arguments of Public Interest in Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights Jurisprudence
As for the European Court of Human Rights’ attitude toward 
«balancing competing interests,» Gäfgen may be regarded as another 
step toward the progressive erosion of the structure of the Convention 
system. As constitutional scholars have recently pointed out, propor-
tionality analysis is becoming commonplace around the world in rights 
1 David Ormerod, ECHR and the Exclusion of Evidence: Trial Remedies for Article 8 
Breaches, 2003 Crim. L. Rev. 61, 64 (U.K).
2 Police and Criminal Evidence Act, 1984, c. 60, § 78(1) (Eng. & Wales) (emphasis 
added).
3 Regina v. Leatham, (1861) 8 Cox C.C. 498, 501 (Q.B.). Earlier authorities point in the 
very same direction. In the 1783 case Ceglinski v. Orr, the English courts took the 
decision not to suppress evidence obtained by means of illegal coercion. In King v. 
Warickshall, (1783) 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B.), the court, though excluding the 
coerced confession, rejected a call for the exclusion of real evidence collected in the 
course of the illegal interrogation. The concept of the “exclusionary rule”, as a matter of 
fundamental Human Rights or Constitutional law, thus originated in the United States, 
despite other legal inheritances from Britain.
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adjudication,1 and European Court of Human Rights law is no excep-
tion. Although the word proportionality does not appear in the Euro-
pean Convention of Human Rights or its Protocols, some commentators 
nevertheless consider it to be a dominant theme in the case law as the 
European Court of Human Rights has held that proportionality is «in-
herent in the whole of the Convention.»2
This claim is extravagant and not at all persuasive. For a start, 
the principle of proportionality does not apply to the absolute rights 
mentioned in Article 15, for which not even a state of emergency can 
justify derogation.3 Other articles, such as Articles 8 through 11 (pri-
vacy, religion, expression, and assembly), incorporate proportionality 
into the text of the ECHR. How, then, could a proportionality discourse 
be applied to Articles 5 and 6, for which the letter of the ECHR provides 
no qualification at all? In this respect, the Court’s argument in Gäfgen 
develops in a sadly common fashion, where rights are first solemnly an-
nounced, then narrowly qualified, and finally surrendered on the basis 
of «proportionality» and the «totality of circumstances» standard.
In the dissenting opinion to the 2008 ruling of Section V, strong 
criticism was voiced against the use of balancing tests stemming from 
Article 3 violations.4 Balancing tests, it was argued, may end up «af-
fording brutality the cloak of the law,» since those disposed to rule 
against human rights will often simply put sufficient weight on the other 
1 See Alec Stone Sweet & Jud Mathews, Proportionality Balancing and Global 
Constitutionalism, 47 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 73, 74 (2008).
2 Sporrong v. Sweden, 52 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 26 (1982). There, the Strasbourg 
Court made the widelycited statement that “the Court must determine whether a fair 
balance was struck between the demands of the general interest of the community 
and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights[.]” On 
proportionality, see Van Dijk & Van Hoof, supra note 76, at 80-82; Frédéric Sudre, 
Droit Européen et International des Droits de l’Homme 167-169 (2008). See also S. Van 
Drooghenbroeck, La Proportionnalité dans le Droit de la Convention Européenne des 
Droits de l’Homme: Prendre l’Idée Simple au Sérieux (2001). 
3 Article 15 refers to Article 2 (right to life), Article 3 (prohibition of torture), Article 4 
(prohibition of slavery and forced labor) and Article 7 (nulla poena sine lege).
4 In the 2008 Judgment of the V Section (supra note 59), Justice Kalydjieva dissented by 
extensively quoting the Grand Chamber’s decision in Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, 
App. No. 37201/2006, at 20. The Saadi case tested the rights of an individual against 
national security and Justice Kalydjieva argued that balancing was an ineffective remedy 
for coerced self-incrimination and openly called for a retrial in which the defendant’s 
rights would be fully respected. Mr. Kalaydjeva further asserted that, in his opinion, 
the precedents of the European Court of Human Rights allowed no distinction in the 
treatment of “statements” and “real evidence” obtained through coercion.
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side of the balance to tip the scale in favor of the «public interest.» In 
Gäfgen, a «balancing» type of reasoning first emerged in the German 
trial court’s interpretation of domestic law. The court employed a bal-
ancing test where the severity of the interference with the defendant’s 
fundamental rights (in this case the threat of physical violence) was 
measured against the seriousness of the offense, the murder of a child. 
The evidence was admitted because «the exclusion of evidence which 
has become known as a result of the defendant’s statement–in particular 
the discovery of the dead child and the results of the autopsy–appears 
disproportionate.»1 The Grand Chamber, when it reviewed the German 
court’s opinion, seemed to reject this argument when it held that the 
right not to incriminate oneself «presupposes that prosecution seek to 
prove their case without resort to evidence obtained through methods of 
coercion or oppression in defiance of the will of the accused.»2 Further, 
the Grand Chamber also stated that in cases concerning Article 3, «there 
can be no weighing of other interests against it, such as the serious-
ness of the offense under investigation or the public interest in effective 
criminal prosecution.»3
Yet, in the very same portion of the opinion, the Grand Chamber 
could not resist the temptation of observing that «different competing 
rights and interests are at stake» in this case.4 The balancing test is clear-
ly outlined in the opinion, as the Court states,
On the one hand, the exclusion of–often reliable and compelling–
real evidence at a criminal trial will hamper the effective prosecution of 
crime. There is no doubt that the victims of crime and their families as 
well as the public have an interest in the prosecution and punishment of 
criminals, and in the present case that interest was of high importance. 
Moreover, the instant case is particular also in that the impugned real 
evidence was derived from an illegal method of interrogation which was 
not in itself aimed at furthering a criminal investigation, but was applied 
for preventive purposes, namely in order to save a child’s life, and thus 
in order to safeguard another core right guaranteed by the Convention, 
namely Article 2. On the other hand, a defendant in criminal proceedings 
has the right to a fair trial, which may be called into question if domestic 
courts use evidence obtained as a result of a violation of the prohibition 
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 27. 
2 Id. at 42.
3 “[F]or to do so would undermine its absolute nature.” Id.at 44.
4 Id.
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of inhuman treatment under Article 3, one of the core and absolute 
rights guaranteed by the Convention. Indeed, there is also a vital public 
interest in preserving the integrity of the judicial process and thus the 
values of civilized societies founded upon the rule of law.
That the goal of fairness in the criminal process often clashes with 
other valuable interests protected by the European Convention (mainly 
the interests of victims and witnesses) is unquestionable. Nevertheless, 
it is open to debate whether reference to proportionality can help in 
solving such clashes. Some European Court of Human Rights rulings 
on Article 6 favor proportionality, in which the «fair balance» between 
the protection of the individual’s procedural rights and the interests of 
the community can only be achieved if restrictions on these rights are 
strictly proportionate to the aim they pursue.1 The very concept of fair-
ness, entrenched in Article 6, implies the need to solve tensions between 
competing values through a pattern of checks and balances. We prefer 
the view that a violation of a fundamental right such as the fair trial, 
precisely because of its «unqualified nature,» ought not be subject to the 
argument of «proportionality» or «balancing tests.»2
C. Alternative Approaches to Illegally Obtained Evidence
A closer look at other Strasbourg precedents suggests that the 
Strasbourg Court could have followed a more demanding approach than 
simple proportionality, or balancing, in this case.3 In Rowe v. United 
Kingdom, for instance, the Court held that the entitlement to disclo-
sure of evidence is not an absolute right.4 Any criminal proceeding may 
involve competing interests (e. g., the efficiency of prosecutions, the 
protection of society, the personal security of intimidated witnesses, 
1 See Ashingdane v. U.K., 93 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 24 (1985). 
2 Cf. Andrew Ashworth, Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure 70 (2002). 
Support to this view may also be found in some ECtHR cases in which the general 
requirements of fairness embodied in Article 6 were said to “apply to proceedings 
concerning all types of criminal offence from the most straightforward to the most 
complex” and thus that “the public interest cannot justify the use of evidence obtained 
as a result of police incitement.” Teixeira, supra note 104, ¶ 36.
3 The tension between fundamental rights and the public interest in European Court of 
Human Rights discourse is brilliantly investigated in Ashworth, supra note 157, at 78. 
The author argues that although “[t]he Court’s approach does use the term ’balance’ 
(or at least ’counterbalancing’), . . . it also sets out some distinct parameters for such 
reasoning.” These parameters should be followed “as a template for some of the ’public 
interest’ cases [where there] . . . is not so much a wide public interest but rather the rights 
of potential victims that are in conflict with the defendant’s rights.”
4 Rowe v. U.K., 16 February 2000, App. No. 28901/95, at 14.
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and the secrecy of investigations), which could be weighed against the 
rights of the accused. Despite these considerations, the Court came to 
the conclusion that «only such measures restricting the rights of the de-
fense which are strictly necessary are permissible under Article 6(1).»1 
Moreover, in order to ensure that the accused receives a fair trial, any 
difficulties caused to the defense by a limitation of its rights must be 
«sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judi-
cial authorities.» As one of the authors of this article has argued, this 
reasoning is «convincing insofar as it conveys that there is a difference 
between allowing certain limited restrictions on a right in case of neces-
sity and holding that all restrictions that can be said to be proportion-
ate to considerations of public interest should be tolerated.»2 This ac-
cords with the unambiguous statement that «[t] he general requirements 
of fairness embodied in Article 6 apply to proceedings concerning all 
types of criminal offense, from the most straightforward to the most 
complex.»3
This approach is persuasive as it gives some priority to the 
fundamental rights of the citizens over the interests of the «majority.» 
In our view, incursions into fundamental rights are only acceptable if 
serving specific and compelling reasons but not simply by reference to a 
generic call for the protection of society. Otherwise, society’s interest in 
repressing crime would always trump the individual’s rights and there 
would be little point in developing a serious human rights discourse.
Jalloh v. Germany4 is an important case for the development of 
the ECtHR jurisprudence on the tension between public interest and 
fundamental rights. In Jalloh, the ECtHR used multiple controversial 
balancing tests to discover whether Article 3 applies. The public inter-
est balancing test is especially problematic, as it seems to incorporate 
a factor weighing the seriousness of the crimes against the degree to 
which one may infringe on fundamental human rights. Essentially, the 
serious concern in Jalloh is what «instant case» would justify a «grave 
1 Id. (emphasis added).
2 Stefano Maffei, The European Right to Confrontation in Criminal Proceedings 64 
(2006), and see also Ashworth, supra note 157, at 61. The latter author also suggests that 
“there must be an assessment of the potential threat to rights in each case … it cannot 
be sufficient to regard a whole category of cases as presenting dangers (e.g. organized 
crime, drug trafficking), in a way that fails to recognize the need for each case to be 
assessed individually.”
3 Teixeira de Castro v. Portugal, 1998-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1451, 1463.
4 Jalloh v. Germany, supra note 4.
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recourse» when dealing with a fundamental human right. In Jalloh, the 
«weight of the public interest» seems to mean that fundamental hu-
man rights can be infringed upon if the «public» has a great interest in 
securing a conviction. For example, having a handful of drugs in one’s 
possession «to eat» is not severe enough to make a fundamental hu-
man right evaporate, but perhaps having a van load of drugs would be?1 
Again, this might well erode the very nature of the fundamental human 
rights under the Convention system.
The use of the public interest balancing test in the Gäfgen case 
further muddies the water. The Gäfgen Court’s application of this same 
public interest balancing test led to a finding that there had been a vital 
public interest, both in saving the victim’s life and in convicting the 
applicant of his murder, which might have justified the use of items of 
evidence obtained through a measure in breach of Article 3. This argu-
ment moves the public interest balancing test to an even more danger-
ous level and seems to open the door to a treat-inhumanly-and-pay-a-
token-penalty policy in cases of serious offenses and public concern.2
Indeed, in the aftermath of Gäfgen, one could imagine a rational 
domestic court ruling that an issue of unfairness (under Article 6) relat-
ing to illegally obtained evidence (under Article 3) only applies where 
the fundamental human rights violation occurs in the context of a minor 
crime or to an offence which does not involve death or serious bodily 
harm. Might it have made more sense for the Grand Chamber to an-
nounce a clear-cut rule that applies Article 6 to all such violations and 
their fruit but makes an exception, as do the United States courts, for 
Miranda violations, when required, to prevent imminent harm to the 
public or an individual?3
1 The question is raised by Ashworth, supra note 68, at 152; in the author’s view the 
language of Jalloh seems to suggest that “in cases where the offence is very serious 
(unlike small-time drug dealing), official compulsion might be permissible without 
violating the privilege against self-incrimination”. 
2 In the U.S., the very same issue has been addressed by Justice Frankfurter in Rochin, 
342 U.S. at 173 (“to attempt in this case to distinguish what lawyers call ’real evidence’ 
from verbal evidence is to ignore the reasons for excluding coerced confessions. Use of 
involuntary verbal confessions in State criminal trials is constitutionally obnoxious not 
only because of their unreliability. They are inadmissible under the Due Process Clause 
even though statements contained in them may be independently established as true. 
Coerced confessions offend the community’s sense of fair play and decency. So here, to 
sanction the brutal conduct which naturally enough was condemned by the court whose 
judgment is before us, would be to afford brutality the cloak of law.”). 
3 Quarles v. New York, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
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Finally, it is also remarkable that the majority opinion in Gäfgen 
failed to address the «judicial integrity» argument, which the dissent-
ers used extensively. In their view, the Gäfgen case generates another 
critical public interest, that is the interest in «ensuring and maintaining 
the integrity of the judicial process, and the admission into a trial of 
evidence obtained in violation of an absolute human right would under-
mine and jeopardize the integrity of that process.»1 Though the situation 
is critical, it is precisely in times of crisis that a society must hold on to 
its foundational values, which must remain uncompromised.
VII. Legal Criteria and Case-by-Case Balancing Tests in the 
Present and Future of the Exclusionary Rule
As suggested earlier, balancing tests inevitably lead to the deroga-
tion of human rights. The long-term implications and possible defects 
of the case-by-case approach developed in Gäfgen may be better under-
stood by looking comparatively at the state of the exclusionary rule in 
the United States.
In Weeks v. United States2 and later in Mapp v. Ohio,3 the United 
States Supreme Court announced that both federal and state courts were 
forbidden under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments from admitting 
real evidence obtained through the means of an illegal search and sei-
zure.4 In addition, in Wong Sun v. United States5 and Silverthorne Lum-
ber v. United States,6 the Court extended the exclusionary rule to the 
indirect product of the above constitutional violations, recognizing the 
«fruits of the poisonous tree» doctrine that forbids courts from admit-
ting evidence derived from the exploitation of the initial constitutional 
violation. «Poisoned fruits» include both real evidence and statements 
by the accused. Thus, the U. S. Supreme Court has not determined that 
1 Gäfgen, supra note 2, at 49 (Jointly Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Rozakis, 
Tulkens, Jebens, Ziemele, Bianku and Power).
2 Weeks, 232 U.S. 383, 398.
3 Mapp, 367 US 643, 655.
4 Thereafter, in Massiah, 377 U.S. at 201 and Miranda 384 U.S. at 436, the exclusionary 
rule was extended to inculpatory and exculpatory statements of suspects when obtained 
in violation of the Fifth, Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments or where such statements 
are obtained during custodial interrogation without warnings and a waiver of the right 
to counsel. Earlier, in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. at 278, the Court has announced 
that state and federal courts are required by both the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments 
to exclude statements obtained by coercive interrogation tactics.
5 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 488-491 (1963), rule re-articulated in relation 
to derivative evidence causally linked to preceding violations.
6 Silverthorne Lumber v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
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exclusion of the direct or indirect product of the constitutional violation 
should turn on a case-by-case balancing test. The Court does not weigh 
the constitutional violation against other factors such as the gravity of 
the offense or generalized public safety or public interest arguments. 
In general, in the United States, the tainted product of a constitutional 
violation is excluded per se from the criminal trial. This is similar to the 
ECtHR’s view that a coerced confession per se amounts to a violation 
of Article 6.
This is not to say that the temptation of balancing has not pervaded 
the U. S. discourse on the matter, albeit in a rather different way than 
in Strasbourg. More recently, in fact, the U. S. Supreme Court has em-
barked on another kind of balancing. As mentioned earlier, the U. S. Su-
preme Court originally identified two rationales for the exclusionary 
rule: «judicial integrity» and «police deterrence.»1 In the last thirty-five 
years, the Supreme Court has jettisoned the judicial integrity rationale,2 
thus freeing itself to balance exclusion solely against the effectiveness 
of deterrence for particular classes of cases.
For example, the U. S. Supreme Court has ruled that the deterrence 
value of exclusion is weak for the following reasons: (1) where the il-
legally obtained evidence is later used in a grand jury investigation,3 
(2) where the evidence could eliminate an immediate, on-going risk 
to the public safety,4 (3) where the evidence is based on a good faith 
reliance on a magistrate’s decision to issue a warrant,5 (4) where the 
evidence is used for impeachment,6 (5) where police fail to knock and 
announce their presence before forcibly entering a dwelling to search,7 
and (6) where the illegality resulted from police negligence rather than 
deliberate misconduct.8 Though dramatically reducing the reach of the 
exclusionary rule and the protection of basic constitutional rights, the 
Supreme Court has at least done so in a way that provides lower courts 
and police guidance for future behavior
The Supreme Court applies the rule in a large variety of generic 
situations, rather than balancing in each case the significance of the 
1 See discussion supra in part IV at pp. 19-21.
2 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
3 United States v. Calandra, 371, U.S. 471 (1963).
4 New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
5 U.S. v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
6 Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 22 (1971); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980).
7 Hudson v Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006).
8 Herring v United States, 555 U.S. 135 (2009).
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violation against the potential deterrence likely to accrue in the future 
by exclusion. As a result, the Supreme Court has done its balancing a 
priori. Thus, unlike European and non-U. S. courts, the U. S. Supreme 
Court has operated under per se rules of either automatic exclusion or 
automatic admission of illegally obtained evidence.1 Though we may 
disagree with a number of choices made by the Court regarding what to 
categorically admit or exclude, at least there is clarity.
The per se or «bright-line» approach to exclusion has the ad-
vantage of providing clear guidance to police officers and lower court 
prosecutors, lawyers and judges. Of course, the problem with a per se 
approach is that it sweeps broadly. For example, it may seem awkward 
to exclude a confession when the suspect is an experienced criminal 
lawyer or judge simply because of a failure to give complete Miranda 
warnings. But the balancing approach taken on a case-by case basis in 
Europe provides police officers and lower court judges with little guid-
ance as to the propriety of their behavior. In theory, the per se approach 
is more protective of human rights, particularly in cases with serious 
charges. After all, in the United States, the gravity of the offense is not 
considered in the exclusion decision, and, thus, significant human rights 
cannot be «balanced away» in favor of a particular public interest. In 
Europe, if an amorphous «public interest» is always in play for some 
Article 3 violations, national judges will have essentially unbridled dis-
cretion to abrogate or derogate significant human rights.
VIII. Conclusion
While Article 3 is revered as enshrining one of the most funda-
mental values of democratic European societies, Gäfgen reveals three 
troubling developments that call into question the non-derogable nature 
of Article 3 rights. First, the ECtHR has divided Article 3 into two dis-
tinct aspects, the prohibition of «torture» as opposed to the prohibition 
on «inhuman treatment.» The Grand Chamber has clearly privileged 
the former over the latter. Second, the conclusion reached in Gäfgen 
implies that there might be circumstances (as in the case of the murder 
of a child) where the application of Article 3 turns on the nature of 
the crime charged, thereby lessening the protection of human rights in 
1 For example, the direct product of an illegally obtained confession or a search 
deliberately conducted without probable cause (absent an ongoing public safety danger) 
is always excluded. At the same time, a Miranda-violated confession or an illegal search 
and seizure can always be used to impeach the criminal defendant victimized by the 
illegality.
